Government Ownership, Firm Value and Choice of SEO Methods--- Evidence from Privatized Chinese SOEs by Paskelian, Ohannes
University of New Orleans 
ScholarWorks@UNO 
University of New Orleans Theses and 
Dissertations Dissertations and Theses 
12-15-2006 
Government Ownership, Firm Value and Choice of SEO Methods--- 
Evidence from Privatized Chinese SOEs 
Ohannes Paskelian 
University of New Orleans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td 
Recommended Citation 
Paskelian, Ohannes, "Government Ownership, Firm Value and Choice of SEO Methods--- Evidence from 
Privatized Chinese SOEs" (2006). University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations. 1050. 
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/1050 
This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by ScholarWorks@UNO 
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is permitted by the 
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from 
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself. 
 
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uno.edu. 
Government Ownership, Firm Value and Choice of SEO Methods--- Evidence from Privatized 
Chinese SOEs 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
University of New Orleans 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in  
Financial Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
Ohannes George Paskelian 
 
B.S. Engineering, American University of Beirut, 1997 
MBA Nicholls State University, LA, 2001 
M.S. Financial Economics, University of New Orleans, 2004 
 
 
December 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2006, Ohannes George Paskelian 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
I would like to thank my professor and mentor, Dr. Tarun K. Mukherjee, for his guidance and 
efforts to complete this dissertation; also, for his invaluable help, encouragement and support both 
inside and outside the school. I extend my thanks to the committee members, Dr. Atsuyuki Naka, 
Dr. Philip Wei, Dr. Gerald Whitney and Dr. Wei Xiao. I also thank other faculty members, staff and 
doctoral students in the Department of Economics and Finance for their encouragement and 
friendship. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the support I received from my family. I greatly 
appreciate my mother, Mary and my three sisters for their support and encouragement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .........................................................................................................................................v 
I.  Introduction......................................................................................................................................7 
II. CHAPTER 1 ....................................................................................................................................8 
2.1 A Brief History of the Privatization Process of Chinese Firms .................................................8 
III. Chapter II - Government Ownership, Firm Value, and Choice of SEO Methods for Chinese 
Firms during 1993-98.........................................................................................................................12 
3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................12 
3.2 Motivation and Contribution....................................................................................................14 
3.3. Literature Review....................................................................................................................16 
3.3.1 Privatization and Ownership Structure .............................................................................16 
3.3.2. Market Reaction to Seasoned Equity Offerings...............................................................18 
3.3.3. Long-Run Performance of SEO issuing firms .................................................................20 
3.4. Predictable Hypotheses ...........................................................................................................21 
3.5. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................23 
3.5.1. Data Source ......................................................................................................................23 
3.5.2. Methodology ....................................................................................................................23 
3.6. Descriptive Statistics ...............................................................................................................29 
3.7. Empirical Results ....................................................................................................................32 
3.7.1. Government ownership and firm efficiency.....................................................................32 
3.7.2. Government Ownership and Choice of SEO method ......................................................35 
3.7.3. Short-Term Performance..................................................................................................37 
3.7.4. Long-term performance Analysis.....................................................................................41 
3.8. Conclusion...............................................................................................................................47 
3.9.References ................................................................................................................................49 
IV. Chapter III - Government Ownership, Firm value, and Choice of SEO Methods for Chinese 
Firms during 1999-2003.....................................................................................................................54 
4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................54 
4.2. Motivation and Contribution...................................................................................................56 
4.3. Literature Review....................................................................................................................57 
4.4. Predictable Hypotheses ...........................................................................................................62 
4.5. Data and Methodology ............................................................................................................64 
4.5.1. Data Source ......................................................................................................................64 
4.5.2. Methodology ....................................................................................................................64 
4.6. Descriptive Statistics ...............................................................................................................71 
4.7. Empirical Results ....................................................................................................................76 
4.7.1. Government ownership and firm efficiency.....................................................................76 
4.7.2. Government Ownership and Choice of SEO method ......................................................79 
4.7.3. Short-Term Performance..................................................................................................81 
4.7.4. Long-term performance Analysis.....................................................................................87 
4.8. Conclusion...............................................................................................................................93 
4.9.References ................................................................................................................................95 
VITA ................................................................................................................................................100 
 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
  In 1991, the Chinese government started the privatization process. A distinguishing feature 
of this privatization process is the presence of the government as a major shareholder in the 
privatized SOEs which creates a unique ownership structure that affects the firm performance, and, 
in turns its choice of equity issuing method.  
This dissertation investigates the relation between ownership structure, firm value, and the 
choice of equity offering method of the Chinese semi-privatized former state-owned enterprises. 
The dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay examines this relationship during the period 
1993-1998 when the Chinese stock exchanges were at the infancy stage. The second essay covers 
the period 1999-2003 when the Chinese government crafted many laws to modernize their stock 
exchanges and protect the investor.  
In the first essay, we find that firms with higher government ownership under-perform 
relative to those with lower government ownership and prefer issuing rights offerings. The market 
reaction to the rights offering is lower than that to the public offering. Finally, the long-term market 
and operating performance of firms issuing rights offerings is poorer than their matched peer group.   
 In the second essay, we find that 1) firms with higher government ownership have still lower 
performance than firms with lower government ownership; 2) firms with higher government 
ownership still use rights offerings as equity issue method; 3) firms with the lowest government 
ownership issue equity using private placements; 4) the market reaction to the announcement of 
private placements is positive; and 5) the monitoring action   provided by the placement buyer has a 
positive effect on the long-term performance of the firms issuing private placements.  
Our results are consistent with previous findings about the effects of government ownership 
on firm value. Privatized firms with high government ownership do not necessarily maximize firm 
v 
value; instead the managers are more aligned with the political and social agenda of the 
government. However, firms with low government ownership and high institutional ownership are 
more profitable. A major contribution of the dissertation is to establish the linkage between 
ownership, performance, and the choice of equity methods. 
 
 
vi 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays: 
 
 
1.  Government ownership, firm value, and choice of SEO methods for Chinese firms during 
1993-98; and 
 
2. Government ownership, firm value, and choice of SEO methods for Chinese firms during 
1999-2003. 
 
The dissertation proceeds as follows. A brief history of the development of the rules and 
regulations pertaining to the privatization process of Chinese firms is provided in Chapter 1. 
This chapter provides rationale for dividing the 1993-2003 period into two sub-periods and 
serves as a common background for both essays. Chapter 2 presents the first essay, while 
Chapter 3 contains the second essay. 
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II. CHAPTER I 
 
2.1 A Brief History of the Privatization Process of Chinese Firms 
 
Since 1949 China was a centrally planned economy in which all enterprises were state 
owned or collectively owned. Investments were centrally planned and funded by government. In the 
late 1980s, as part of enterprise reforms that took place during China’s gradual transition to a 
market economy, local governments in China started experimenting with selling shares of 
collectively owned enterprises directly to domestic individuals in order to raise equity capital. These 
trading of enterprise shares followed by over-the-counter (OTC) trading in more organized but still 
informal exchanges.  
 In 1991, two stock exchanges, one created by the Shanghai municipal government and the 
other by the Shenzhen municipal government, were launched, with the central government’s formal 
approval. The two exchanges now have a modern infrastructure with a computerized automated 
trading system, a high-speed nationwide satellite communications system backed by digital data 
networks, and an efficient clearing and settlement system. Stock market development in China took 
off in the early 1990s, roughly at the same time as it did in other transitional economies (Pistor et al. 
2000). But According to Pistor and Xu (2004), China’s stock market is performing better than the 
markets of most other transitional economies in terms of standard measures of stock market 
performance, such as the number of listed firms, market capitalization, liquidity, and fundraising 
capacity. By the end of 2000, while many stock markets in transitional economies were plagued by 
low market capitalization and low liquidity, China’s total stock market capitalization jumped to 
over US$507 billion. Consequently, China’s stock market became the second largest in Asia, after 
Japan’s. (Wong, 2005) 
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 China’s stock market had three unique features that made its rapid development unique and 
interesting. First, the government used it largely as a fundraising vehicle for funding state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). As a result most listed enterprises were state controlled, with only one-third of 
the enterprises’ equity capital sold to private shareholders during initial public offerings (IPOs). The 
other two-thirds of the equity capital raised, was held either by state asset management agencies or 
by SOEs themselves. In an effort to maintain its control over listed enterprises, the government 
forbade trading of state-owned shares on China’s two exchanges, and the state-owned shares could 
be transferred only after approval from state-asset-management authorities had been obtained, 
which made these shares effectively non-tradable (Wong 2005). The transfer of state-owned shares 
to private shareholders was rare in the 1990s. At the end of the 1990s, more than 90% of the 
enterprises listed on China’s two stock exchanges remained state controlled, with state-owned 
entities as their controlling shareholders.  
Second, China’s stock market developed under a repressed financial regime. Financial 
repression was created through a combination of capital controls on international capital flows and 
administrative measures imposed by the central government to soften potential competition among 
different financial assets (e.g., bank deposits, enterprise stocks, enterprise bonds, various kinds of 
government bonds) within the domestic financial sector. While the capital controls helped to 
prevent capital from flowing out of the country, the competition-mitigating administrative controls 
sought to avoid the driving up of returns on various financial assets and thus to allow the 
government to maintain a source of cheap capital for financing SOEs’ investments (Li 1994, Li 
2001, Gordon and Li 2003). Third, China’s stock market was developed under a weak legal 
framework that offered shareholders little protection. On the widely used indicators for shareholder 
rights protection developed by La Porta et al. (1998), China scored 3, compared with the average 
score of 3.61 for all other transitional economies (Pistor and Xu 2004). Empirical studies also 
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indicate that in China, formal law and law enforcement have played at best a marginal role in 
protecting shareholders (Tenev and Zhang, 2002, Pistor and Xu 2004).  
Until 1999, China didn’t have a real securities law per se. As a result, the minority 
shareholders were not protected, thereby stymieing the development of a properly functioning 
capital market (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 1997 and 1998, Pistor and Xu 2004). To 
address this deficiency, the Securities Law of 1999 was enacted at the 6th Meeting of the Ninth 
National People's Congress on December 29, 1998, establishing the most important set of laws 
regarding the issuing and trading of securities in the People's Republic of China. The purpose of this 
law was to standardize the issuing and trading of securities, protect the lawful rights and interests of 
investors, safeguard the economic order and public interests of society and promote the 
development of the socialist market economy1.  
The most important features of the Securities Law of 1999 are as follows: 
• The shares must be made available following approval of the State Council Securities 
Management Department. 
• The company’s total share capital must not be less than RMB 50 million. 
• The company must be in business for more than 3 years and made profits over the last three 
consecutive years. This requirement applies also to former state-owned enterprises 
reincorporating as private or public enterprises. They can calculate the 3 years 
consecutively. The number of shareholders with holdings of value reaching in excess of 
RMB 1,000 must not be less than 1,000 persons. Shares offered must be more than 25 
percent of the company’s total share capital. In addition, the company total share capital 
must exceed RMB 400 millions, the ratio of publicly offered shares must be more than 15 
percent. 
                                                 
1 For complete listing of the Chinese Securities Law of 1999 please refer to the website www.csrc.gov.cn 
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• The company must not have committed major illegal activities or false accounting records in 
the last three years. 
The new plan announced by the China Securities Regulatory Commission highlighted the 
government's mounting concern with the poor state of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets, 
which had performed worse than any in the world over the past eight years, even as China's 
economy grew at nearly 9 percent annually during the same period. 
Pursuant to the 1999 Securities Law, China started a new reform to free more than 1,300 
largely state-owned companies to gradually sell shares of stock controlled by the government, 
putting nearly $270 billion worth of state assets on the trading block. This enhanced privatization 
process furthered the country's transition toward capitalism.  
During this time period, new methods of issuing equity emerged in the Chinese stock 
market: in 1999, Chinese firms were allowed to issue private placement as a means of raising new 
equity in addition to the two methods (rights offering and public placement) that existed in the pre-
1999 era. It is important to note that the Chinese government through its securities commission does 
not impose a restriction on the type of the equity offering method a firm may use. The choice of the 
method is left to the issuing company’s discretion.2
 
                                                 
2 For complete listing of the Chinese Law please refer to the following website http://www.cclaw.net/default.asp 
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III. Chapter II - Government Ownership, Firm Value, and Choice of SEO 
Methods for Chinese Firms during 1993-98 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Several studies argue that private ownership and clearly defined property rights provide 
better incentives for the managers, and therefore, privately owned firms perform better than firms 
with state ownership and central planning (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, Laffont and Tirole, 1993, 
Shleifer, 1998). In the 1980s, most of Central and Eastern European Countries initiated large-scale 
privatization programs to reform the poorly performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, 
these mass privatization programs failed in the absence of a well-functioning financial infrastructure 
(Estrin, 1998, and Laporta, Lopez de-Salinas, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002).  
The privatization process of Chinese SOEs stands in contrast to the process in the Central 
and Eastern Europe: the Chinese government, unlike others, continues to own a substantial stake in 
the company. Chinese privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) started in 1991. In 1990, 
China had about 300,000 SOEs with about 75 million state employees (Cao, Qian and Weingast, 
1997). These SOEs were heavily financed by the state owned banks. Most of these SEOs had 
oversupply of employees and were largely unprofitable. China adopted a unique privatization 
structure by partially selling state owned shares to the public.  This partial-privatization 
encompassed all but the largest and strategically important SOEs, such as banks and financial 
institutions. The goals of the Chinese privatization policy were to raise revenue for the state, reduce 
government’s interference in the economy and stimulate economic efficiency by introducing 
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competition and market discipline (Huyghebaert and Quan, 2004), and to end the reliance of the 
SOEs on government-owned financial resources3.  
The extent of state ownership varies among Chinese firms. The purpose of this essay is two-
fold. The first objective is to show that the performance of Chinese firms is inversely related to the 
extent of state ownership. The second objective is to demonstrate that higher government ownership 
will lead these firms to choose rights offering in preference to public offering during the 1993-99 
period during which only these two methods of SEO were available to these firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides motivation for this essay. Section III 
discusses pertinent literature in three subsections: 1) ownership structure and performance, 2) 
seasoned equity offerings—short-term performance, and 3) seasoned equity offerings—long-term 
performance. Section IV develops testable hypotheses. Section V explains the sample selection 
process and testing methodology. Section VI presents summary statistics, while Section VII reports 
empirical results. Finally, Section VIII provides summary and conclusions. 
                                                 
3 Chinese government used to protect SOEs against bankruptcy by offering various forms of financing, such as 
budgetary subsidies, trade credit via other SOEs or loans from state-owned banks. (Gao and Shaffer, 1998) 
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3.2 Motivation and Contribution 
 
 According to the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), higher managerial ownership 
better aligns the interest of managers with external stockholders and, therefore, is more conducive 
to the value maximization principle. However, this relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm value may not apply when the government is the largest shareholder as is the case of China. 
Indeed, state ownership is generally viewed as being inefficient (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, and 
Megginson and Netter, 2001). Shleifer (1998) argues that state ownership fails to motivate 
managers to innovate, implement cost reductions and/or improve profitability. In addition, in semi-
privatized firms, the goal of shareholders’ wealth maximization might take a back seat to the 
government’s political and social goals.4  
The implication of the state ownership on firm value for Chinese firms has been investigated 
in several studies (Wei and Varela, 2003; Hassan, D’Souza, Wei and Varela, 2003; Wei, Xie and 
Zhang, 2005). Non-value maximization behavior of firms in the presence of high government 
ownership is evident from these studies. In this essay, I extend this line of research by investigating 
a potential link between the extent of the government ownership in a firm and the method of 
seasoned equity offering (SEO) a firm chooses. This essay covers the privatization period from 
1993 through 1998, during which rights offerings and public offerings were predominant SEO 
methods. . Based on the finding of earlier studies that the level of  firm performance is negatively 
related to the degree of government ownership, I argue that firms with higher government 
ownership (inferior performers) are more likely to choose the rights offering, while firms with lower 
government ownership (superior performers) are more likely to choose the public offering method. 
                                                 
4 On the other hand, in countries where the markets are not well developed and corporate control is not well established, 
the government may be more efficient in monitoring the firm than other small investors (Lin, 2000).  
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The principal basis for this argument is that disclosure requirements are tougher for public offering 
than for rights offering and the latter does not require underwriter’s certification.. 
In testing my proposition above, I follow three major steps. First, I confirm the findings of 
existing studies that, resulting from inefficiency, the greater the state ownership, the worse the 
performance. Step two tests the hypothesis that relatively poor performance, resulting from high 
government holdings, will encourage these firms to issue rights offering in preference to public 
offering. In the final step, I demonstrate that short- and long-term performance of rights-issuing 
firms will be lower than their matched peer groups since rights issuing firms are poor performers to 
begin with, additional money raised will exacerbate the cost associated with free cash flow problem. 
Thus, I expect these firms to do even worse than their peer group who opted not to issue external 
equity financing.  
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3.3. Literature Review 
  
Below I present the relevant literature in three sections: A) on the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value, B) on the market reaction to SEOs, and C) on long-term post-
issuance performance of SEO firms. 
 
3.3.1 Privatization and Ownership Structure 
  
According to the property rights theory, private enterprises should perform better than either 
state-owned enterprises or enterprises with mixed ownership structure; Empirical evidence on the 
performance of enterprises with mixed ownership is scarce. Boardman and Vinning (1989) analyze 
a sample of the 500 largest non-US industrial firms and demonstrate that private enterprises 
outperform both state-owned enterprises and enterprises with mixed ownership. They explain this 
result by the conflict between private and public shareholders in mixed enterprises, which in turn 
decreases the effectiveness of the management monitoring. They conclude that partial privatizations 
may be worse than complete privatizations.  
Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) do not find any benefits in the partial privatization of 
SOEs. They show that the higher the percentage of shares owned by the government, the lower is 
the performance of the firm. They conclude that to increase the success rate of the privatization, the 
government should reduce its ownership stake in the newly-privatized firms and not interfere with 
the management.  
Megginson and Netter (2001) argue that government ownership of firms result in altering 
the shareholder-wealth maximizing model of the western corporations.  They argue that the 
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government usually has social agenda that does not fit with the firm’s shareholder-wealth 
maximizing model. Shleifer (1998) argues that even if the government agrees that profit 
maximizing is the goal of the firm, it is difficult for it to write complete contract that adequately ties 
mangers’ incentives to that goal because of its social agenda. Shleifer (1998) concludes that there 
will always be differences in the performance between state-owned and privately held firms because 
there is a broader range of monitoring devices under private ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
argue that privatization without allocation of residual rights to management is unlikely to guarantee 
more productive or profitable uses of resources. Moreover, when government’s social objective 
prevails on the profit maximization of the firm, the privatization alone is unlikely to enhance the 
productivity of the firm.  
In spite of drawbacks over its completely privatized counterpart, mixed ownership has 
advantages including the following two. First, state ownership can act as a signal that the 
government will commit to its current privatization policy and will not implement a re-
nationalization in the future (Mok and Hui, 1998, Perotti, 1995). Second, in countries where the 
capital markets and corporate control are not well developed, the government may be more efficient 
in monitoring the firm than other small investors (Lin, 2000).  
The studies on the Chinese firms’ post-privatization performance confirm the general 
prediction that higher government ownership in firms result in lower performance. Wei, Xie and 
Zhang (2005) study the relation between ownership structure and firm value in the privatized 
Chinese firms during the period 1991-2001. They find that state ownership is negatively related to 
firm value. In addition, they report a convex relation between Tobin’s Q and state ownership and  a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and Q. Overall, their results suggest that when 
a government privatizes firms that were previously state-owned and retains significant ownership 
after privatization, then conflicts of interest among different block shareholders may actually 
decrease firm value. D’Souza, Hassan, Wei and Varela (2003) examine pre and post privatization 
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financial and operating performance of 208 firms in China during 1990-1997. They find that  higher 
state ownership in Chinese firms result in lower performance.  
 
3.3.2. Market Reaction to Seasoned Equity Offerings 
 
Announcement effects of SEOs by U.S. firms have been vigorously investigated over the 
years. Results of these investigations point to two near- unanimous observations. First, public 
placements bring about significantly negative market reaction5. Second, negative reaction, if any, to 
a rights offering is significantly smaller than that of a public offering6.  
A popular explanation for the differences in the market reaction to seasoned equity issues 
involves information effects. Researchers often attribute the well-documented negative effect of 
announcements of seasoned equity offerings to the adverse selection problem. Miller and Rock 
(1985) predict a negative stock price reaction to equity issues because the market perceives them as 
releasing negative information about the firm’s cash flows. In a world where asymmetric 
information exists, firms should issue new shares under two situations:  when they have highly 
profitable investments that cannot be financed by other means or when managers believe that the 
shares are overvalued.  
Other explanations for negative price reactions include free cash flow hypothesis and price-
pressure hypothesis.  Jensen (1986) contends that the access to funds from issuing additional stock 
increases the amount of discretionary cash available to managers. Because investors recognize this, 
they attribute higher agency cost to the new issue and react negatively. According to Scholes 
                                                 
5 Myers and Majluf, 1984 and Miller and Rock, 1985 provide theoretical explanations for the negative announcement 
effects of new SEOs. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) provide empirical evidence of the 
negative announcement effects. 
6 Asquith and Mullins (1986), Kolodny and Suhler (1985), Masulis and Korwar (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986) 
and Schipper and Smith (1986) provide comparative evidence of short-term reaction of different SEO issue methods in 
the order of -2.5% to -3.5% 
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(1972), the price-pressure hypothesis, selling pressure drives down a firm’s share price when it 
announces plans to issue new shares. Thus, the market may respond negatively when mature firms 
with limited growth opportunities announce their intention to issue new shares.   
The issue regarding the choice of SEO methods is also rooted in the event-study literature. 
Empirical evidence from the U.S. shows that, while the announcement effects of public placements 
are, on average, significantly negative, the announcement effects of rights issues are close to zero, 
or substantially less negative than in the case of public placements. For example, Smith (1986) and 
Eckbo and Masulis (1995) both document an average abnormal return of about –3.0 percent for 
U.S. industrial firms for a 2-day event window. In contrast, for rights issues, Smith (1977) reports 
zero abnormal returns in the announcement-month, and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) document an 
average abnormal return of about –1.0 percent for both industrials and utilities in the U.S. Despite 
lower direct and indirect floatation costs with rights issues, an overwhelming majority of firms have 
used the more expensive public placements. 
Researchers have offered various explanations to help solve the puzzle. Smith (1977) 
advances a monitoring cost hypothesis. He suggests that managers gain personal benefits from 
using underwriters in public placements, but receive fewer benefits of this type from the more 
mechanical floatation method of rights offerings. Thus, the higher costs incurred in placements 
reflects a lower bound of monitoring costs.  
Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) develop a model based on the information asymmetry between 
the firm seeking new equity and outside investors. The model assumes 3 choices of equity offering 
methods: fully underwritten offers, uninsured rights offers and standby rights offers. In their model, 
only highest quality firms are willing to pay the costs incurred with a rights offering; the exogenous 
fixed investigation costs associated with standby rights offerings. The intermediate quality firms 
pay the endogenously determined signaling costs incurred with the uninsured rights offerings. 
Finally, the low-quality firms remain undistinguished, using an uniformed underwriter to sell their 
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shares. Also, they assume that at the time of the announcement of the equity offer, the firm knows 
more about its future stock price (firm quality) than either investors or underwriters. Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) empirically test the above model and show that the market reaction for the 
uninsured rights is positive, for standby rights is positive but close to zero, while for underwritten 
public offering is negative. 
 
3.3.3. Long-Run Performance of SEO issuing firms  
  
The long-run stock performance after a seasoned equity offering has been widely 
documented. Using matching firms, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1995) find that issuers under-perform their benchmarks in the average proportion of 7% per year. 
However, the issue of measuring the long-term market performance has been a topic of debate  in 
literature.   
Fama (1998) points out the difficulty in clearly identifying and measuring the long-run stock 
price reaction to a specific event. Several researchers point out that measuring long-run abnormal 
performance after an event is subject to mispricing problems. More specifically, Conrad and Kaul, 
1993; Barber and Lyon, 1997 and Kothari and Warner, 1997 point to time aggregation of abnormal 
returns, Jegadeesh, 1997 and Mitchell and Stafford, 1998 discuss the  problem related to pricing 
model specification, and Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 1999 identify  the problem stemming from time 
dependence of events. One source of the mispricing problem is the size effect. A large part of the 
average post-SEO performance can be attributed to small firms (Brav, Geczy and Gompers, 1999).  
Aside from the mispricing problems, Jeanneret (2005) underlines the impact of the issuing 
conditions and the institutional setting on the long-run stock performance. The issuance process 
differs from one market to another and is not neutral to the post-SEO performance. In European and 
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Asian countries, unlike the U.S., the predominant issuance process is rights offerings. Researchers 
offer two ways to avoid the limitations associated with investigating long-term abnormal returns. 
According to Conrad and Kaul (1993), accounting measures can provide a good alternative to 
market measures of long-term performance Loughran and Ritter, 1995 recommend buy-and-hold 
return (BHAR) as an alternative to long-term abnormal returns.  
 
3.4. Predictable Hypotheses 
 
Most researchers are in agreement that the presence of government ownership gives rise to 
inefficiencies and, consequently, poor performance (Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh, 1994, 
D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; and Megginson and Netter, 2001). The higher the government 
ownership, the higher the inefficiency as the value maximization motive will be compromised by 
other motives in the government agenda. The inefficiency increases as the government ownership 
increases as the monitoring activities by institutions and large non-government block holders 
decrease.   
Consistent with this prediction, Wei, Xie and Zhang (2005) report that higher government 
ownership in the privatized Chinese firms decreases the firm’s performance. To assess the 
relationship between government ownership and firm performance in our sample, we hypothesize 
the following:  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the government ownership, the higher the inefficiency. 
The higher the government ownership implies the higher the possibility that the interests of 
the government and non-government owners will conflict. Information asymmetry problem 
increases as government ownership increase. In addition, the higher the government ownership 
implies the lower the potential ownership by institutional and large non-government shareholders. 
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Potential co-existence of all these problems associated with high government ownership will deter 
these firms from divulging their true values. Consequently, these firms will resort to the right-
offering method of SEO. On the other hand, firms with low government ownership are more likely 
to have less conflict between the interests of internal and external shareholders, more monitoring 
role played by institutions and large shareholders, and a lesser degree of information asymmetry. 
These firms are likely to enjoy better future investment opportunities and will aim to maximize the 
firm value by choosing the underwriter certification i.e., underwritten public offering. Based on the 
preceding premise, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypotheses 2: The higher the government ownership, the higher the likelihood that the firm 
will choose rights offerings;  
Continuing the same argument as above, we add the following two hypotheses regarding the 
short-term and long-term performance of Chinese firms involved in seasoned equity offerings. 
Hypothesis 3: Short-term performance (abnormal return at announcement) for rights 
offering would be lower than that of a public offering. 
Hypothesis 4: A. Long-term performance of firms that choose rights offering is  
inferior to that of their peer group.  
B. Long-term performance of public-offering firms is superior to their peer 
group. 
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 3.5. Data and Methodology 
  
In this section, we discuss the data source, research methodology, and how we test for price effects 
of announcements of rights offerings.  
 
3.5.1. Data Source 
 
 We obtained the data needed for this study from CSMAR China Stock Market Trading 
Database and CSMAR China Seasoned New Issue and Rights Offerings Research Database. Our 
test period covered 1993 through 1998. During this period, the rights offering and public 
placements were the two predominant methods fof SEOs.  
 The sample consists of 400 announcements of seasoned equity offerings by firms listed in 
either Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 378 of them were standby rights 
offerings and 22 were underwritten public offerings. The stock price data is obtained from the 
CSMAR trading database.  
 
3.5.2. Methodology  
 
In the methodology section we elaborate on the econometric techniques used to test each of 
the hypotheses presented in section IV.  
To test Hypothesis 1 (the higher the government ownership, the higher the inefficiency), we 
perform both parametric and non-parametric tests. Since all the public offerings were done by firms 
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with below median government ownership, the Kruskal-Wallis test first divides the sample in terms 
of below and above median government ownership. Then, it shows the relationship between the 
extent of government ownership on the one hand and variables that measure and contribute to the 
inefficiency on the other. The variables we use to assess the inefficiency of the firms are: the non-
essential expenses, NESSEX, the investment opportunity set of the firms, INVEX, the debt ratio, 
DB, the percentage of shares owned by the managers of the firm, MANOWN, and the percentage of 
shares owned by the institutional shareholders, INST. 
Additionally, to test the hypothesis at 1, we use OLS regressions in which ROA and Tobin’s Q 
serve as dependent variables. ROA measures operating performance, while Tobin’s Q measures 
market performance. The regression equation with ROA as the dependent variable is as stated 
below. 
 
   
ROA = β0 + + β1NESSEX + + β2INVEX + β3DB + β4MANOWN + β5INST +β6GOV + ε 
  
We expect the signs of the non-essential expenses, debt ratio and government ownership to 
be negative, while the sign of the investment opportunity set, managerial ownership and 
institutional ownership variables to be positive. 
When  Tobin’s Q serves as the dependent variable,  the model takes the following form:  
 
Q = β0 + β1NESSEX + + β2INVEX + β3DB + β4MANOWN + β5INST +β6GOV + ε 
 
We expect the signs of the variables NESSEX, DB and GOV to be negative and  INVEX, 
MANOWN and INST to be positive.  
 To test Hypotheses 2 (the higher the government ownership, the higher the likelihood that the 
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firm will choose rights offerings) we use a Logit model of firms’ choice of alternative SEO 
methods. The dependent variable is 0 if a firm issues a rights offerings and 1 if the firm issues a 
public offering. The independent variables consist of proxies for agency costs, political costs and 
investment opportunities, leverage ratio. 
To test Hypothesis 3 (Short-term performance (abnormal return at announcement) for rights 
offering would be lower than that of a public offering), we  employ the event study methodology 
recommended by Brown and Warner (1985) to examine the effects of rights issues on stock returns. 
The abnormal return for firm i on day t is  
 
ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,i,t
 
Where, Ri,t is the return on day t for a firm in our sample, and Rm,i,t is the market return on day t. 
Average abnormal returns for each trading day is: 
 
,
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Where, N is the number of stocks. 
 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return from day K to L is  
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The t-statistics for the null hypothesis that CARK,L = 0 is  
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Where, T= K – L + 1; Var(ARt) and Cov(ARt,ARt+1) are estimated from 122 days to 11 days before 
the announcement day and from 11 days to 122 days after the announcement day. The Covariance 
term adjusts for possible first-order autocorrelation between the abnormal returns due to non-
synchronous trading.  
To check the robustness of our event study results, we employ a Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) regression analysis with CAR as the dependent variable. GLS equation is shown below.):  
CARi,−1,0 = α1 + β2MANOWNi + β 3INSTi+ β 4GOVi  
+ β 5NESSEXi + β 6DUMMYi + εi  
where, DUMMYi is a dummy variable that takes value one if the issue is a rights offering and zero if 
it is a public offering. The MANOWN is the percentage of shares owned by the senior managers. 
The INST is a variable representing the percentage of shares owned by the institutional 
shareholders. GOV is the percentage of shares owned by the government, NESSEX is the non-
essential expenditure which is calculated as the total expenses minus costs of goods sold, wage 
expenses and interest expenses as a fraction of total expenses. We add several other variables to the 
base model to test for the interaction of those variables on the firm’s stock price. The other variables 
chosen are: SHAREi is the ratio of the number of shares offered to the number of shares outstanding 
prior to the offering, a proxy for the extent of share dilution in the case for underwritten offerings 
and the degree of potential shareholder take-up in the case of rights issues, CARi,−10,−1 is the 
cumulative daily abnormal returns during a ten-day period beginning at 10 days before the issue 
announcement day, a proxy detecting possible stock price run-up prior to the event day, and STDi is 
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standard deviation of stock returns calculated over a period from 125 days before the announcement 
day and 125 days after the announcement, a proxy for the risk of the issue. 
  
Finally, to test Hypothesis 4 (Long-term performance of firms that choose rights offerings is 
inferior to that of the public-offering firms), we follow two procedures. First, we use Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) methodology to calculate the average buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR). The 
average buy-and-hold abnormal return, BHAR, for τ months is calculates as:  
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Where, ri,t is the monthly stock return for announcement firm i and rc,i,t is the monthly market return 
or the monthly return on matched portfolio firm i.  The test statistic for the null hypothesis of no 
average buy-and-hold abnormal return is the skewness adjusted t-statistic calculated as:  
 
tBHARτ = tBHARτ + (
1
3
N )(tBHARτ)2skewτ + (
6
N )skewτ
 
Where, tBHARτ is the usual t-statistic for BHARτ and skewτ is the skewness of the BHARt series 
(t=1,…τ) 
 
Second, we use long-term accounting performance to measure the profitability and operating 
efficiency of the firms post-issuance. The profitability performance measures that we use are: 1) 
ROA; and 2) Profit Margin. In addition, I use an operating performance measure.  The profitability 
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and operating performance variables are calculated 1 and 2 years post-issuance and compared with 
a matched sample of firms. The firms in the matched sample are selected according to three criteria: 
industry affiliation, size and government ownership. In all the cases, we first select a firm that 
matches the same industry category as the issuing firm, controlling for the size and government 
ownership percentage. We follow the methodology described in Megginson, Nash and 
Randenborgh (1994) in a controlling for the government ownership in the matched sample firms 
selection process. We expect the rights issuing firms to perform worse than their matching group of 
firms since the inefficiency of the first group would be compounded by the free cash flow problem. 
On the other hand, we expect that the long-term performance of the public-offering firms would be 
superior to that of their peer group resulting from the reduction in information asymmetry. .  
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3.6. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section shows the summary statistics for the new equity issue method. The descriptive 
summary proceeds into two parts: First, we present the industry classification table of the sample of 
firms issuing rights offerings and public offerings. Second, we present the total number of issues per 
year and total proceeds from the issues. Third, we present a modified table where we use the median 
of the government ownership variable to divide the total sample in two sub-samples; above and 
below median. 
Table 1 shows the total number of companies that issued new equity during the period 1993-
1998 classified according to the major industry group. 
 Table 1: Industry Classification of a sample of 400 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) with 378 Standby Rights 
Offerings (ROs) and 22 Underwritten Public Offerings (Pos) during the period 1993-1998.  The SEOs are identified 
from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. (CSMAR)  
Industry Type 
Rights 
Offerings 
(RO) 
Public 
Offerings 
(PO) 
RO % PO 
% 
Electrical, Electronic and 
Industrial Manufacturing 
Equipment 
125 12 33.07% 54.55% 
Mining and Metal Products 39 2 10.32% 9.09% 
Information Technology 63 3 16.67% 13.64% 
Consulting Services 18 0 4.76% 0.00% 
Real Estate  28 0 7.41% 0.00% 
Paper, Publishing and 
Consumer Goods 64 4 16.93% 18.18% 
Transportation 14 0 3.70% 0.00% 
Conglomerates 9 0 2.38% 0.00% 
Retailing 5 0 1.32% 0.00% 
Food and Beverages 7 0 1.85% 0.00% 
Miscellaneous 6 1 1.59% 4.55% 
Total 378 22 100% 100% 
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Table 2 reports the number of rights offerings and public offerings per year. 
During the period of 1993 to 1998 there has been a steady increase in the use of rights 
offerings as a primary method of equity issue. While for the case of public offerings, 
there isn’t a steady increase in its usage. Table 2 reports also the total net proceeds per 
year from issuing new equity. The total net proceeds which is in billions of the Chinese 
currency Renminbi, is calculated as the total proceeds from the offering minus the total 
issuing expenses. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of a sample of 400 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) with 378 Standby Rights 
Offerings (ROs) and 22 Underwritten Public Offerings (POs) during the period 1993-1998. The Total Net 
proceeds are in billions of Chinese Currency Renminbi (RMB), calculated as the total proceeds from the 
equity issue minus the total issuing expenses.  The SEOs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings 
database. (CSMAR)  
 
Year Number of 
SEOs 
 
Rights 
Offerings 
(Standby) 
 
Underwritten 
Public 
Offerings 
 
Total Proceeds 
from ROs 
 
Total 
Proceeds from 
POs 
1993 20 15 5 5.16 0.47 
1994 35 31 4 5.79 0.38 
1995 56 55 1 14.86 0.08 
1996 41 41 0 96.48 0.00 
1997 105 101 4 841.37 0.26 
1998 143 135 8 965.15 1.48 
Total 400 378 22 1,928.81 2.67 
 
 
In Table 3 we report the number of seasoned equity offerings divided into two 
groups by the median of the percentage of government ownership variable, GOV, the 
median being 0.2091. The total sample of 400 firms is divided into two half, and there are 
only Rights offerings firms in the upper half, while all the 22 public offering firms are in 
the lower half of the sample. The interesting result to report from table 3 is the fact that 
all the underwritten public offerings were made by firms that have low government 
ownership.  Therefore, just by comparing the two sub-samples, we  notice that firms with 
higher government ownership rely exclusively on rights offerings as their equity issue 
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method, while firms issuing public offerings have lower government ownership 
concentration. 
 
Table 3: Distribution of the total sample of 400 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) with 378 Standby 
Rights Offerings (ROs) and 22 Underwritten Public Offerings (Pos) during the period 1993-1998 divided 
by the median (0.2091).    
Government 
Ownership SEO Type 
 ROs POs 
Above Median 201 0 
Below Median 177 22 
 
In table 4 we report the correlation matrix of the variables that will be used in the 
regression analysis. The results clearly shows that correlation between ROA on the one 
hand and NESSEX, DB, and GOV on the other is negative, although only GOV’s 
coefficient is statistically significant.. This provides indirect evidence of inefficiency 
when government ownership is relatively high. 
 
Table 4: The correlation matrix of the variables used, the ROA, NESSEX, non-essential expenses, DB, the 
debt ratio, INVEX, the investment opportunity set, and the percentage of shares owned by the government, 
GOV, MANOWN, the managerial ownership percentage and the INST, the institutional ownership 
percentage. 
Variable NESSEX INST MANOWN INVEX DB GOV ROA 
Non-Essential Expenditure (NESSEX) 1.00       
Institutional shareholders (INST) -0.133c 1.00      
Managerial Ownership (MANOWN) -0.042 0.173c 1.00     
Investment opportunity Set (INVEX) -0.215b 0.272b 0.051 1.00    
Debt Ratio (DB) 0.114 -0.121 -0.069 -0.105 
1.00 
   
Government Ownership (GOV) 0.513a -0.214c -0.072 -0.317b 0.216c 1.00  
ROA -0.141 0.184c 0.056 0.271a -0.108 -0.214b 1.00 
a significant at 1%,b significant at 5% ,c significant at 10% 
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 3.7. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical analysis part is divided into 4 sections within which we test each of 
the hypotheses proposed in section IV of the essay. In the first section we establish the 
relationship between government ownership and firm efficiency. In the second section, 
we study the effect of the government ownership on the choice of the seasoned equity 
offering method. In the third section, we study the short-term performance of the firms 
issuing SEOs. Finally, in the last section, we study the long-term performance of the 
equity issuing firms post-SEO.  
3.7.1. Government ownership and firm efficiency 
 The relationship between government ownership and firm efficiency is tested 
using  parametric and non-parametric tests. Table 5 reports the results of the non-
parametric, Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Table 5: The sample of 400 firms issuing SEOs during the period 1993-1998 is divided by the median 
value of the government ownership variable, GOV into two sub-samples. For each independent variable, 
the median is calculated for each sub-sample; the Chi-square statistic is the Kruskal-Wallis test of medians. 
Variable Above Median 
Below 
Median 
Chi- 
Square 
statistic 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
Non-Essential Expenditure (NESSEX) 0.0684 0.0473 13.594 0.003 
Institutional shareholders (INST) 0.0931 0.1431 14.485 0.001 
Managerial Ownership (MANOWN) 0.0107 0.0195 2.667 0.314 
Investment opportunity Set (INVEX) 0.0915 0.0597 11.391 0.005 
Debt Ratio (DB) 0.1184 0.0513 18.284 0.001 
 
 The total sample of firms issuing SEOs is divided by the median value of 
government ownership, GOV (the median being 0.2091). The independent variables are 
the 1) NESSEX, the non-essential expenses which is computed as the total expenses 
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minus costs of goods sold, wage expenses and interest expenses divided by the total 
expenses; 2) INVEX, the Investment expenditure which is the long-term investment 
expenditure divided by the total assets; 3) DB, the debt-to-asset ratio; 4) MANOWN, the 
percentage of shares owned by the firms managers; 5) INST, the percentage of shares 
owned by the institutional shareholders of the firm.  
For each of the independent variables in the table we find the median value for 
each sub-sample and use the Kruskal-Wallis test for the medians. The non-essential 
expense (NESSEX) and debt ratio (DB) are significantly larger for firms with high 
government ownership than their low government counterparts, while Institutional 
holdings (INST) variable of the former is significantly lower than the latter. These results 
attest to the inefficiencies of and lack of monitoring for firms with high government 
ownership  This may explain why these firms were unable to take advantage of higher 
(than firms with low government ownership) investment opportunity set.  
In order to test hypothesis 1, we use two OLS regressions. In the first regression, 
ROA is the dependent variable. The independent variables are: 1) the non essential 
expenses, NESSEX; 2) the investment opportunity set, INVEX; 3) The debt ratio, DB; 
and 4) the Government ownership, GOV.  The results are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6: The dependent variable is the ROA, the independent variables are NESSEX, non-essential 
expenses, DB, the debt ratio, INVEX, the investment opportunity set, and the percentage of shares owned 
by the government, GOV. 
 Regression 1 
Intercept 4.666a
 (8.380) 
NESSEX -0.752b
 (-1.990) 
INVEX 0.027 
 (0.347) 
DB -0.193a
 (-3.946) 
GOV -1.287b
 (-1.641) 
MANOWN -0.032 
 (-0.405) 
INST 0.915c
 (1.371) 
R2 0.398 
a significant at 1%,b significant at 5% ,c significant at 10% 
 
Table 6 demonstrates that the higher the government ownership, the lower the 
firm’s operating performance (ROA). The coefficient of GOV is negative and significant 
at the 5% level. Consistent with this finding, the coefficients of NESSEX and DB are 
negative, while that of INST is positive. All three coefficients are statistically significant. 
In Table 7, we use Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable while independent 
variables are the same as in Table 6. Table 7 confirms the results in Table 6. Consistent 
with hypothesis 1, firms with higher government ownership, higher debt ratio and higher 
non-essential expenses are likely to have lower Q. A major conclusion that can be 
derived from Table 6 and 7 is that high government ownership adversely affects both the 
operating and market performance of a firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
Table 7: OLS regression with the dependent variable being Tobin’s q ratio, Q. The independent variables 
are the non-essential expenses, NESSEX, the investment opportunity set, INVEX, the debt ratio, DB, the 
government ownership percentage, GOV, the percentage of managerial ownership shares, MANOWN, and 
the percentage of institutional shares, INST.  
 Regression 1 
Intercept 11.369a
 (7.369) 
NESSEX -0.697a
 (-2.522) 
INVEX 0.369 
 (0.328) 
DB -0.295a
 (-7.946) 
GOV -0.532b
 (-2.179) 
MANOWN 0.018 
 (0.325) 
INST 0.985a
 (3.647) 
R2 0.278 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
3.7.2. Government Ownership and Choice of SEO method 
In Hypothesis 2, we argue that that higher government ownership and the 
resulting poor performance would likely render these firms to choose the rights offering 
method to raise external equity. To test this hypothesis, we perform a logistic regression 
in which we attempt to determine the variables that affect a firm’s choice of one of the 
two available methods of seasoned equity offerings. When a firm chooses rights offering, 
the dependent variable takes on a value of 1, when it chooses underwritten public 
offering, its value is 0. Table 8 we report the results of the logistic regression.  
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Table 8: Binary logistic regression to explain the choice of the SEO method using a sample of 400 SEOs 
with 378 Standby Rights Offerings (ROs) and 22 Underwritten Public Offerings (POs) during the period 
1993-1998. The dependent variable is the method of raising equity which takes on a value of 1 when a firm 
issues ROs and 0 for when it issues POs. MANOWN is the percentage shares held by managers, INST is 
the percentage of shares held by the Institutional shareholders including institutional and private investors 
but excluding the government. GOV is the percentage of shares held by the government. NESSEX is the 
ratio of non-essential expenditures over total expenses. MB is the market to book ratio. INVEX is the long-
term investment expenditure to total asset ratio. DB is the total debt over total assets ratio. SEOP is the 
logarithm of the net proceeds from the SEO. ROE is the return on equity ratio. Industry dummy is a 
variable presenting the industry classification of the different firms. 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Intercept -0.341 -0.298 -0.425 -0.384 
 (0.418) (0.441) (0.517) (0.418) 
MANOWN -1.845 -1.985 -1.136 -1.274 
 (0.107) (0.118) (0.481) (0.394) 
INST -0.759 b -0.548 b -0.948 b -0.824b
 (-1.978) (-2.047) (-1.917) (-2.118) 
GOV 0.895 b 0.721 b 0.687b 0.597 b
 (1.895) (1.958) (2.130) (1.985) 
NESSEX 2.647 c 1.698 c 1.874 c 1.742 c
 (3.147) (3.127) (2.841) (2.982) 
MB 0.127 0.247 0.096 0.147 
 (0.187) (0.217) (0.169) (0.278) 
INVEX -0.547 -0.687 -0.519 -0.511 
 (0.297) (0.314) (0.409) (0.427) 
DB 0.478 0.419 0.485 0.397 
 (0.586) (0.506) (0.621) (0.587) 
ROA  -0.096   
  (0.547)   
SEOP   -1.487 a  
   (0.007)  
Industry dummy    3.047 
    (0.317) 
Pseudo R2 0.294 0.305 0.275 0.297 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10 
 
Table 8 reports four different models of binary logistic regression; in Equation 1, 
right-hand side variables are MANOWN, INST, GOV, NESSEX, MB, INVEX, and DB. 
Equation 2 adds to these ROA, while Equation 3 replaces ROA with SEO proceedings 
(SEOP) and in Equation 4, an industry dummy is added to assess the effect of different 
industries on the choice method. The industry dummy is a qualitative variable to account 
for the effect of different industry classifications among the firms issuing rights offerings 
and public offerings. In all three regressions, rights offering firms are characterized by 
high government ownership, high non-essential expenses, and low institutional holdings. 
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All three variables are statistically significant. The opposite is true when a firm issues 
public offering. The industry dummy does not have a significant coefficient in equation 
four, therefore the industry effect on the choice of the offering method is not affected by 
the firm’s industry classification. The variable SEO proceeding shows that the higher the 
proceeding of the seasoned equity offering, the more likely the firm will issue public 
offering over rights offerings.  
 
3.7.3. Short-Term Performance 
Our third hypothesis is an extension of Hypothesis 2. Our logic proceeds as 
follows. High government ownership introduces inefficiencies which lead to poor 
performance. Because of the poor performance record, a firm with high government 
ownership will prefer the rights offering method to public placement. Consequently, the 
firms issuing rights offering will receive lower abnormal returns than their public-
offering counterparts. To test this hypothesis, we examine the abnormal returns at the 
announcements of the issuance of the two offering methods. We apply the conventional 
event study methodology for this purpose. The abnormal returns are calculated using the 
market model parameters estimated over a 220-day period ending 21 days before the 
announcement date (as estimated by Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). The results are reported 
in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9 reports the abnormal returns for rights offering 
announcement, while Table 10 does the same for public placement announcements.  
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Table 9:Cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 378 Rights offering firms during the period 1993-
1998. The ROs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. (CSMAR). Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 220-day period ending 21 days before the 
announcement date. The Chinese stock market’s equally weighted index is used in the market model to 
compute betas. The abnormal returns are calculated in the intervals. The Wilcoxon signed rank test for the 
differences in medians appears in the last column. 
 Cumulative abnormal returns for RO firms 
Interval Mean % Z – statistic Median % Signed rank test 
-5 , -1 -0.74 -1.543 -0.45 -874.50 
-1 , 0 -2.51 -10.369a -1.54 -4589.50 a
0 -2.19 -14.547 a -0.98 -4236.50 a
-1 , +1 -3.54 -10.347b -2.14 -5147.50 a
+1 , +5 -0.27 -1.0551 d -1.05 -2365.50 c
-10 , +1 -2.19 -7.364 a -3.54 -4572.50 a
-10 , +10 -2.84 -8.254 a -4.58 -4258.50 a
a significant at 0.1% b significant at 1% c significant at 5% d significant at 10%  
 
Table 9 shows that announcement effects of the rights offering are consistently 
negative and statistically significant. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for  the 
window of (-1, 0), a window often reported by researchers is  -2.51% and is significant at 
the 0.1% level. 
The results are quite opposite, as Table 10 demonstrates, when a firm chooses 
public offering. CARs are positive and significant for all windows. CAR for the (-1, 0) 
window is 7.58% and significant at the 0.1% level. 
Table 10: Cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 22 Public offering firms during the period 1993-
1998. The POs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. (CSMAR). Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 220-day period ending 21 days before the 
announcement date. The Chinese stock market’s equally weighted index is used in the market model to 
compute betas. The abnormal returns are calculated in the intervals. The Wilcoxon signed rank test for the 
differences in medians appears in the last column. 
 
 Cumulative abnormal returns for the PO firms 
Interval Mean % Z – statistic Median % Signed rank test 
-5 , -1 5.12 14.214a 4.98 3541.50b
-1 , 0 7.58 71.547a 6.78 4102.50 a
0 4.56 61.247 a 3.41 4431.50 a
-1 , +1 11.36 54.254 a 9.68 5197.50 a
+1 , +5 3.02 10.369 a 2.11 2476.50 d
-10 , +1 27.36 41.367 a 18.54 7849.50 a
-10 , +10 24.31 47.256 a 17.63 7852.50 a
a significant at 0.1% b significant at 1% c significant at 5% d significant at 10%  
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To summarize the results in Tables 9 and 10, investors in Chinese firms react 
negatively to rights offering and positively to underwritten public offerings. The results 
are consistent with our third hypothesis H3 and clearly indicate that the rights offering 
signals bad news, while public offering signals good news to investors. This finding is of 
particular interest because opposite finding appear to prevail for the non-Chinese firms.  
A large number of studies on U.S. firms have shown that SEOs are associated with 
negative abnormal returns, especially when the method used is firm commitment 
underwritten oﬀer. On the other hand, studies (Kang and Stulz, 1996 and Bøhren, Eckbo 
and Michalsen, 1997) document positive abnormal returns to uninsured rights issues in 
other countries. The unique ownership structure of Chinese firms might explain this 
contradiction.  
 
In Table 11, we validate our finding in Tables 9 and 10 that negative (positive) 
abnormal returns of rights offering firms (public offering firms) are related to the extent 
of government ownership in Chinese semi-privatized firms. To explain the abnormal 
returns surrounding SEO issue announcements, we estimate the cross-sectional regression 
using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) where the dependent variable is the cumulative 
abnormal return over the window (-1, 0). We estimate 3 different models of the equation 
to assess the effect of different variables on the stock price. 
39 
 Table 11: GLS regression to explain the valuation effect of the SEO announcement a sample of  400 SEOs 
with 378 Standby Rights Offerings (ROs) and 22 Underwritten Public Offerings (POs) during the period 
1993-1998. The dependent variable is an the cumulative abnormal return during the two-day 
announcement window CAR(-1,0). The independent variables are: MANOWN is the percentage shares 
held by managers, FIVEMAJ is the percentage of shares held by the five major shareholders including 
institutional and private investors but excluding the government. GOV is the percentage of shares held by 
the government. NESSEX is the ratio of non-essential expenditures over total expenses. SEOP is the 
logarithm of the net proceeds from the SEO. SHARE is the ratio of the number of shares offered to the 
number of shares outstanding prior to the offer. STD is the standard deviation of stock returns calculated 
over a period from 125 days before the announcement to 125 days after the announcement. DUMMY is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if it is a RO and 0 if it is a PO. The p-values are reported under each 
coefficient in the parentheses.  
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Intercept 0.759 0.187 0.107 
 (0.211) (0.164) (0.157) 
MANOWN 0.137 0.096 0.104 
 (0.248) (0.305) (0.281) 
INST 0.169 c 0.147b 0.106 b
 (0.074) (0.036) (0.041) 
GOV -0.039 b -0.024 b -0.025 b
 (0.031) (0.018) (0.021) 
NESSEX -0.057 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.549) (0.517) (0.274) 
SHARE  0.147  
  (0.194)  
STD   -0.687 
   (0.247) 
DUMMY -0.516a -0.368 a -0.321 a
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R2 0.348 0.324 0.218 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
Three variables that affect announcement returns are the government ownership 
concentration, institutional holding, and the dummy variable representing the method of 
external equity financing.  Government ownership and rights offering negatively affect, 
while institutional holding positively affect announcement returns. In summary, higher 
ownership by the government destroys value, but higher institutional ownership creates 
value. The results support hypothesis 3. 
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3.7.4. Long-term performance Analysis 
 Hypothesis 4 states that long-term post-announcement performance of rights 
issuing firms will be inferior to that of public offering firms. In this section, we examine 
both market and operating performance of Chinese firms that issued seasoned equity 
offering. 
In examining long-term performance, it is necessary to select a benchmark against 
which the sample performance must be evaluated. Barber and Lyon (1997) find that 
results are influenced by the benchmark being selected. We select two benchmarks for 
the purpose of comparisons.  
The first benchmark consists of firms which 1) did not issue new equity during 
the same period, 2) belonged to the same industry, 3) were of similar to post-issuance 
asset size, and 4) similar degree of government ownership as the SEO firms. If a 
matching company could not be found in the same industry, we select a company closest 
to the issuing company’s industry with similar size. This benchmark is used to evaluate 
both operating and market performance. When evaluating market performance, we add 
the market return (weighted average of returns of stocks listed in the two exchanges in 
China) as a second benchmark..  
Table 12 compares the market performance of the rights and public offering firms 
with that of the two benchmarks stated above.  Panel A of Table 12 shows that the long-
term market performance of the rights offering sample is significantly inferior to that of 
the benchmarks. This result is especially true for +2 and +3 years.  Rights issuing firms 
significantly under-perform the market portfolio by 5.85% and 10.27% in year +2 and 
year +3 respectively.  Compared to the matched sample, their levels of underperformance 
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are 13.58% and 12.08% in year +2 and year +3 respectively. Both differences are  
significant at the 5% level 
 
Table 12: Long-term returns of Rights issuing firms and public issuing firms with their respective non-
issuing matching firms using holding period return method. The sample of matching firms for the rights 
issuing firms consists of 200 firms matched in size and industry and government ownership concentration 
(The mean of the government ownership percentage is 30% while the median is 19%) with the Rights 
issuing firms. The sample of matching firms of the public issuing firms consist of 20 firms matched in size, 
industry and government ownership percentage with the Public issuing firms (The mean of the government 
ownership percentage is 11% while the median is 9%).  The mean difference is tested using a two-tail t test 
while the median difference is tested using a nonparametric Wilcoxon Z test.  
 1 year (+1) 2 years (+2) 3 years (+3) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
PANEL A. MARKET PERFORMANCE OF RIGHTS ISSUING FIRMS 
Comparison with market return 
Return of Rights Offering Firms 11.45 7.81 20.63 17.69 47.24 31.64 
Market Return 11.87 6.23 26.48 19.32 57.51 41.94 
Difference -0.42 1.58 -5.85b -1.63 -10.27a -10.3b
       
Comparison with matched firms 
Return of Rights Offering Firms 11.45 7.81 20.63 17.69 47.24 31.64 
Return of the matched firms 12.67 8.29 34.21 21.48 59.32 40.21 
Difference -1.22 -0.48 -13.58b -3.79c -12.08b -8.57b
 
 
 
PANEL B. MARKET PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC OFFERING FIRMS 
Comparison with market return 
Return of Public Offering Firms 16.75 10.12 24.36 18.34 57.91 40.56 
Market Return 11.87 6.23 26.48 19.32 57.51 41.94 
Difference 4.88 b 3.89 b -2.12 -0.98 0.4 -1.38 
       
Comparison with matched firms     
Return of Public Offering Firms 16.75 10.12 24.36 18.34 57.91 40.56 
Return of the matched firms 10.68 3.69 17.42 15.11 36.79 24.37 
Difference 6.07 b 6.43 6.94 b 3.23 21.12a 16.19 a
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
Opposite results hold true for the public offering group.  The group significantly 
outperforms the market in year +1. Compared to the matched sample, this group performs 
significantly better in all three of the post-issuance period.  These results are consistent 
with our hypothesis that long-term market performance of the rights offering group is 
inferior to its public offering counterpart. 
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Table 13: Comparison of long-term accounting performance between firms issuing rights offerings and a 
matched sample firms.  The sample of matched firms consists of 200 firms matched in size, industry and 
government ownership percentage with the Rights issuing firms (The mean of the government ownership 
percentage is 30% while the median is 19%). The mean difference is tested using a two-tail t test while the 
median difference is tested using a nonparametric Wilcoxon Z test. The ROA is calculated as the net 
income over total assets. The Operating performance is calculated as income from operations divided by 
the total assets. The profit margin is calculated as net income over revenue.   
 Pre-offering year Offering Year 
1 Year after 
offering 
2 Years after 
offering 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
PANEL A. ACCOUNTING 
PERFORMANCE OF RIGHTS 
ISSUERS         
a) ROA         
Rights Issuing Firms 2.36 1.2 2.11 1.03 1.95 0.87 2.09 1.41 
Matched Sample  2.41 1.24 3.14 2.11 3.65 2.32 3.71 2.78 
Difference -0.05 -0.04 -1.03 -1.08 -1.7c -1.45b -1.62c -1.37b
         
b)  Operating Performance (EBIT/TA) 
Rights Issuing Firms 3.41 1.98 4.02 2.15 3.17 1.07 3.11 1.87 
Matched Sample  5.47 2.36 5.21 2.34 5.11 2.41 4.89 2.13 
Difference -2.06b -0.38 -1.19 -0.19 -1.94b -1.34c -1.78b -0.26 
         
c) Profit Margin         
Rights Issuing Firms 5.31 2.86 5.14 2.54 4.52 2.17 3.98 1.98 
Matched Sample  7.13 3.25 8.04 3.21 5.69 3.18 6.02 3.52 
Difference -1.82b -0.39 -2.9 -0.67 -1.17c -1.01 -2.04a -1.54b
 
PANEL B. ACCOUNTING PER-
FORMANCE OF PUBLIC 
PLACEMENT ISSUERS 
         
a) ROA Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Public Issuing Firms 4.23 2.05 5.03 2.12 5.29 2.35 5.87 2.47 
Matched Sample 4.38 1.98 4.41 2.08 4.17 1.87 4.32 1.96 
Difference -0.15 0.07 0.62 0.04 1.12c 0.48 1.55b 0.51 
         
b) Operating Performance (EBIT/TA) 
Public Issuing Firms 7.15 4.52 8.02 4.57 8.32 4.68 8.47 4.97 
Matched Sample 7.25 4.17 7.11 3.68 7.21 3.67 7.23 3.48 
Difference -0.1 0.35 0.91 0.89 1.11 b 1.01 1.24b 1.49b
         
c)  Profit Margin         
Public Issuing Firms 10.14 7.11 11.03 7.86 11.89 8.01 10.34 7.25 
Matched Sample 9.24 6.54 9.87 6.13 9.97 6.88 8.97 5.37 
Difference 0.9 0.57 1.16b 1.73b 1.92b 1.13b 1.37b 1.88b
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10% 
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Table 13 compares the accounting performance of SEO issuers with the matching 
benchmark. Panel A concerns the rights offering group, while Panel B deals with the 
public offering group. The accounting performance of the two groups mirrors their 
market performance shown in Table 12. On all three measures of accounting 
performance, the rights issuers under-perform, while issuers of public offers out-perform 
their corresponding matching groups. Once again, the  results are for +1  and +2 are 
significant. . The mean value of the difference between the ROA of the rights offering 
firms and its matched sample is -1.7 after 1-year and -1.62 after 2-years, both significant 
at the10% level. The mean value of the difference of the operating profit between the 
rights offering firms and its matched sample is -1.94 after 1-year and -1.78 after 2-years, 
both significant at the 5% level. Finally, the mean value of the difference of the profit 
margin between the rights offering firms and its matched sample is -1.17% after 1-year 
and -2.04% after 2-years, the first being significant at the 5% while the second at the 1% 
level. Median differences give similar results. To sum up, the post-issue performance of 
the rights- issuing firms deteriorates while the same for the public-offering firms  further 
improves relative to their respective  peer groups.  
 For the sample of public offering firms the accounting performance is better than 
the matched sample. The mean value of the difference between the ROA of the public 
offering firms and its matched sample is 1.12% after 1-year and 1.55% after 2-years, both 
significant at the10% level. The mean value of the difference of the operating profit 
between the public issuing firms and its matched sample is 1.11% after 1-year and 1.24% 
after 2-years, both significant at the 5% level. Finally, the profit margin of the public 
issuing firms exceeds that of the matched sample by 1.92% in year +1 and 1.37% in year 
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+2. Both results are significant at the 5% level. The median difference results are similar 
results to those of the means difference. 
Table 14: Comparison of long-term accounting performance between firms issuing rights offerings and 
firms issuing public offerings; the sample of firms issuing rights offerings is 378 firms, while the sample of 
firms issuing public offerings is 22 firms. The mean difference is tested using a two-tail t test while the 
median difference is tested using a nonparametric Wilcoxon Z test. 
 Pre-offering year Offering Year 
1 Year after 
offering 
2 Years after 
offering 
Return on assets (ROA) Mean Median Mean  Median Mean Median Mean  Median 
Rights Issuing Firms 2.36 1.2 2.11 1.03 1.95 0.87 2.09 1.41 
Public Issuing Firms 4.23 2.05 5.03 2.12 5.29 2.35 5.87 2.47 
Difference -1.87b -0.85 -2.92a -1.09c -3.34a -1.48b -3.78a -1.06c
         
Operating Performance (EBIT/TA) 
Rights Issuing Firms 3.41 1.98 4.02 2.15 3.17 1.07 3.11 1.87 
Public Issuing Firms 7.15 4.52 8.02 4.57 8.32 4.68 8.47 4.97 
Difference -3.74a -2.54a -4.00a -2.42a -5.15a -3.61a -5.36a -3.1a
         
Profit Margin         
Rights Issuing Firms 5.31 2.86 5.14 2.54 4.52 2.17 3.98 1.98 
Public Issuing Firms 10.14 7.11 11.03 7.86 11.89 8.01 10.34 7.25 
Difference -4.83a -4.25 a -5.89 a -5.32 a -7.37 a -5.84 a -6.36 a -5.27 a
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
We confirm the results found about by comparing the long-term performance of 
the two samples together. In Table 14, we compare the long-term accounting 
performance of the two samples; rights offering firms with the public offering firms. The 
mean difference for the three accounting measure is negative and significant, confirming 
hypothesis 4. Table 15 reports the buy and hold abnormal returns of the two samples. 
Again, rights issuing firms under-perform public offering firms in all three post- issuance 
years  
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Table 15: Long-term returns of Rights offering firms compared to Public offering firms using holding 
period return method. The mean difference is tested using a two-tail t test while the median difference is 
tested using a nonparametric Wilcoxon Z test 
 1 year 2 years 3 years 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Comparison of two samples together  
Return of Rights Issuing Firms 11.45 7.81 20.63 17.69 47.24 31.64 
Return of Public Offering Firms 16.75 10.12 24.36 18.34 57.91 40.56 
Difference -5.3a -2.31 a -3.73 a -0.65 -10.67 a -8.92 a
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
To summarize, the evidence presented in Table 12 through Table 15 strongly 
supports our hypothesis that SEO firms that make rights offering significantly under-
perform their public offering counterparts.  
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 3.8. Conclusion 
 
Privatization process in China that started in the early 1990’s has created a unique 
ownership structure in which the central government continues to own a large portion of 
the company. However, the extent of government ownership varies from one firm to 
another. The primary purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that a) the higher the 
government ownership, the inferior the firm performance and the greater the probability 
that the firm will choose rights offering over public placement when making seasoned 
equity offering.  
This study covers a period that spans from 1993 through 1998. During this period, 
two primary methods for the seasoned equity offering were rights offering and public 
offering. Four hypotheses that this study examines are:  
1) Higher government ownership produces inefficiencies in the firm. The 
inefficiency results from agency conflicts as the wealth-maximization 
goal may be compromised by the social and political agenda of the 
government. 
2) Inefficiency of a firm, due to high government ownership, would lead 
to inferior performance of this firm relative to a firm that has low 
government ownership. 
3) Due to poor performance, a firm with high government ownership 
would prefer rights offering to public offering, as the latter process 
requires certification from the underwriter. 
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4) The market would perceive rights offering as signaling bad news and 
react accordingly.  Consequently, the abnormal return to the 
announcement of rights offering would be lower (less positive or more 
negative) than that of the public offering announcement. Long-term 
performance of firms issuing rights offering would also be inferior to 
that of firms issuing public placement. 
The results reported in this study are consistent with the above hypotheses. 
Higher government lead to greater inefficiency (higher unnecessary expenses and 
leverage). Pre-announcement market (Tobin’s Q) and operating performance 
(ROA) of firms with high government ownership are significantly lower than 
firms with lower government ownership. A firm with high government ownership 
is more likely to choose rights offering as a way to issue seasoned equity. Both 
short-term and long-term (post-issuance) performance of the rights offering group 
are inferior to its public offering counterpart. The result regarding announcement 
returns associated with the issuance of seasoned equity is opposite of what is 
found for the U.S. firms, where abnormal returns are in general positive for rights 
offering and negative for public offering. The unique ownership structure for 
Chinese firms might explain this dichotomy.  
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IV. Chapter III - Government Ownership, Firm value, and Choice of 
SEO Methods for Chinese Firms during 1999-2003 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The positive announcement effect of private placement is well documented in the 
finance literature. Usually, private placements are viewed differently from other types of 
equity issues such as rights offerings or underwritten public offerings. In rights offerings 
and public offerings, the potential equity buyer is considered a passive investor and 
therefore the adverse-selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) applies to the equity 
financing. In contrast, in private placements, the investors can play more active role, 
either informational or organizational, in the firm’s issuing the private placements. 
 Two hypotheses have been proposed to explain the positive announcement effect 
of private placements, changes in ownership concentration (Wruck, 1989) and mitigation 
of asymmetric information (Hertzel and Smith, 1993); both of them are based on the 
premise of active monitoring of the private placement investor is value enhancing for the 
firm. Wruck (1989) finds that the announcement returns are related to changes in 
ownership concentration, consistent with the non-linear relationship between firm value 
and ownership structure suggested by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Wruck (1989) 
argues that new equity blocks placed causes a substantial change in the ownership 
concentration, therefore creating a monitoring effect. Using the same definition for 
announcement returns as introduced by Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that 
the announcement returns are related to placement price discounts and new block sizes. 
They argue that price discounts reflect information costs that the new investors incur in 
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private placement. As a result, the gain of firm value should be related to fraction placed 
(a proxy for the amount of valuation uncertainties to be mitigated). They hypothesize that 
in private placement new block-holders play role mitigating asymmetric information, or 
create a certification effect.  
Starting the early 1990s, the Chinese government started the gradual privatization 
process of the Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). However, until 1999, there 
weren’t complete and clear laws regulating the stock markets operation, protecting the 
investor and reducing market manipulation and insider trading. Starting 1999, the 
Chinese government adopted major laws organizing and modernizing the two stock 
markets; Shanghai and Shenzhen.  One of the major effects of the new rules was the 
introduction of private placements as a third method of raising equity capital. From the 
inception of the Chinese stock markets, Chinese firms were only using two methods to 
issue new equity: rights offerings and underwritten public offerings. However, starting 
1999, more and more firms started using private placements as a third tool to issue new 
equity.  
 In the first essay of the dissertation, we establish that the government ownership is 
a major determinant in the choice of the seasoned-equity issue (SEO) in Chinese firms. 
Firms with higher government ownership concentration use rights offerings as their 
primary method of raising equity, while firms with lower government ownership use 
public offerings. Also, the firms with higher government ownership are less-efficient and 
their financial performance deteriorates after 2 years post-SEO. The large percentage of 
shares owned by the Chinese government well beyond the privatization of SOEs is 
explained by the social and political agenda of the government. The change in the 
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regulations and the introduction of private placements as a third equity issue method 
raises two important questions that need to be investigated.  
The main purpose of the paper is twofold. First, we investigate whether the 
evidence from the U.S literature that the monitoring or certification effect of the private 
placements apply to the Chinese firms in other words, does the change in ownership 
concentration has a positive impact on firm value. Second, we study whether the 
government ownership affects firm value and its choice of the equity issue method. The 
next section highlights the motivation of the paper, its contribution to the current 
literature and its implications on the effects of ownership change in firms. 
 
4.2. Motivation and Contribution 
The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between the change in 
ownership concentration and firm performance in Chinese firms during the period of 
1999-2003. The majority of Chinese SOEs were privatized early 1990s, however with a 
large percentage of shares still owned by the government. On 1998, the Chinese 
government undertook a major reform of the stock market by modernizing the rules and 
regulations that protects the investor and controls for market manipulation and insider 
trading. The main questions raised in this paper are divided into two categories. One 
section of the paper examines the relationship between the change in the ownership 
concentration and the performance of the firm. The second part of the paper focuses on 
effects of the government ownership on firm value and its choice of equity issuing 
method. 
Therefore, the paper tries to answer the following three questions: 
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1. Do the private placements as a new equity issue method, affect firm value and 
performance due to the monitoring effects of the new ownership on the firm?   
2. Does the monitoring effect of private placements as it is documented in the 
finance literature apply to the Chinese case: does the change in ownership 
concentration have positive effect on firm value? 
3. Does the government ownership affect firm value and its choice of equity issuing 
method? 
 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section expands on the literature that 
is related to the private placements and change in ownership concentration. Section four 
explains the predictable hypotheses. Section five elaborates on the sample selection and 
the methodology used followed by section six which highlights the summary statistics. 
The following section reports empirical results and relates them to the predictable 
hypotheses. Finally, the last section concludes and summarizes the paper. 
 
4.3. Literature Review 
 
The positive announcement effect of SEOs has been associated with private equity 
issues. The evidence applies for both U.S and international context (e.g., Wruck, 1989 
and Hertzel and Smith, 1993, for the U.S.; Kato and Schallheim, 1993 and Kang and 
Stulz, 1996, for Japan; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005, for Sweden). The existing literature 
offers two widely cited hypotheses. First, Wruck (1989) argues that private equity sales 
are usually highly concentrated. Therefore, insiders’ ownership structure is significantly 
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changed after the placement. Wruck (1989) finds a significant relationship between the 
announcement returns and ownership concentration changes. In particular, the 
relationship shows that private sales that cause managers to be more aligned with the 
interests of shareholders add value. Conversely, private sales that cause management 
entrenchment or less interest-alignment with shareholders destroy value. Thus, new 
private equity sales induce a nonlinear relationship between firm value and ownership, in 
line with the Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) hypothesis. From this evidence, Wruck 
(1989) concludes that the monitoring/entrenchment effect can explain the positive 
announcement effect of private equity placements. Ownership structure effects have been 
studied by looking at the changes in the level of ownership concentration. The higher the 
level of ownership concentration the easier it is for a small group of shareholders to 
influence management behavior through their voting power. The more diverse the 
shareholding, the easier it is for management to pursue their own interests as the level of 
influence by non-management shareholders decreases (Mitchell, 1983). Wruck (1989) 
proposed an ownership structure hypothesis in her study of private placements in the U.S. 
Her ownership structure hypothesis states that bother the changes in and the resulting 
level of ownership concentration are important. She found positive abnormal returns 
surrounding private placements that are directly related to changes in ownership level 
when the firms are at low or at high level of ownership concentration after placements. 
An adverse-relationship is found for sample firms with moderate level of ownership 
concentration after placements. 
Hertzel and Smith (1993) provide a second alternative hypothesis. They argue that 
private equity placements are a solution to the Myers-Majluf adverse selection problem. 
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They emphasize that private investors are not organizational active but instead are 
informational active. Private equity sales tend to reduce asymmetric information because 
managers can better communicate with a small number of private investors. It follows 
that placement discounts must reflect compensations for information costs borne by 
private investors. Using the same definition for announcement returns as introduced by 
Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith find a significant relationship between the 
announcement returns and new placed sizes. Thus, they interpret that the above 
relationship is consistent with a certification effect. The certification comes from the 
value-enhancing, informational involvement of private investors, which causes a positive 
shift in the market’s assessment of the firm value of the issuers.  
Both the two hypothesis above are premised on private investors' active 
involvement through new equity sales. However, Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan 
(2001) have recently challenged this premise directly. Using a U.S. data set much larger 
than used in previous studies, Barclay et al. find that private investors are actually not 
active. Thus, it is unlikely that private investors fulfill organizational and informational 
roles: as such, this finding casts doubt on the monitoring and certification hypotheses.  
 Hertzel et al. (2002) analyze the long-term performance of U.S. firms issuing 
private placements. They find that the long-term performance in the three-year period 
following private placements of equity is worse than an industry and size matched sample 
firms documenting the puzzling announcement effect: the positive announcement effect 
of the private placement as opposed to the negative long-term performance of the firms 
issuing them.  
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The interesting question to study in this essay is whether the private placements 
will have positive effect on the firm value through the certification and the monitoring 
provided by the private placement buyer. 
 
 Several recent articles study the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm value in emerging economies. Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Sheifer and Vishny (1998) 
argue that agency problems in many emerging markets are relatively more severe due to 
the absence of strong legal protections and other government mechanisms. Claessens and 
Djankov (1999) examine firms in the Czech Republic and find that firm profitability is 
related to ownership concentration. They argue that the higher the ownership 
concentration among few shareholders, the better the performance of the firm. Anderson, 
Lee and Murrell (2000) study Mongolia’s mass privatization and find that enterprises 
with residual state ownership appear to be more efficient than other enterprises. They 
argue that in an environment that lacks basic regulatory infrastructure protecting the 
investor. More recently, Dyck and Zingales (2004) study private benefits of control 
around the world and find that higher private benefits of control are associated with less 
developed capital markets and more concentrated ownership. Lins (2003) investigates 
whether managerial stock ownership and non-managerial block holdings are related to 
firm value in 18 emerging markets. He finds that firm values are lower in situations 
where a management owns large blocks of the firm’s shares. Lemmon and Lins (2003) 
study the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in 8 East Asian 
economies. They find that the managers prefer to attract outside minority investors and 
by doing so, the firm value increases. Wei and Varela (2003) use shanghai-listed firms 
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during the period 1994-1996 to examine the relationship between the firm’s market 
performance and ownership structure. They find that Tobin’s Q is significantly negatively 
related to state shares and that institutional and foreign ownership have inconclusive 
effects on firm performance. Wei, Xie and Zhang (2005) study the ownership structure 
and firm value in China over the period 1991-2001. They find that the government 
ownership is negatively related to the firm’s performance measured by Tobin’s Q ratio. 
They also find that foreign ownership are positively related to Tobin’s Q. Wei, Xie and 
Zhang (2005) use a large sample of 5284 firms over during the years 1991-2001 to study 
the conflicts of interest among different block shareholders affect firm value.  
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4.4. Predictable Hypotheses 
 
In the first essay, it was reconfirmed what most researchers have found 
previously, that the presence of government ownership gives rise to inefficiencies and, 
consequently, poor performance (D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Megginson and Netter, 
2001; and Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh, 1994). The higher the government 
ownership, the higher the inefficiency as the value maximization motive will be 
compromised by other motives in the government agenda. The inefficiency increases as 
the government ownership increases as the monitoring activities by institutions and large 
non-government block holders decrease.   
In this essay, we reassess the relationship between government ownership and 
firm performance in our sample, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1: The higher the government ownership, the higher the inefficiency. 
The higher the government ownership implies the higher the possibility that the 
interests of the government and non-government owners will conflict. Information 
asymmetry problem increases as government ownership increase. In addition, the higher 
the government ownership implies the lower the potential ownership by institutional and 
large non-government shareholders. Potential co-existence of all these problems 
associated with high government ownership will deter these firms from divulging the true 
value (over-valued) their true values. Consequently, these firms will resort to the right-
offering method of SEO. On the other hand, firms with low government ownership are 
more likely to have less conflict between the interests of internal and external 
shareholders, more monitoring role played by institutions and large shareholders, and a 
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lesser degree of information asymmetry. These firms are likely to enjoy better future 
investment opportunities and will aim to maximize the firm value by choosing the 
underwriter certification i.e., underwritten public offering. Moreover, firms with the 
lowest government ownership structure coupled with high institutional ownership will 
choose private placements to increase the monitoring certification of the institutional 
investors, therefore increasing firm value. Based on the preceding premise, the following 
hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypotheses 2A: The higher the government ownership, the higher the likelihood 
that the firm will choose rights offerings;  
Hypothesis 2B: For firms with lower government ownership, the higher the 
institutional ownership the greater the likelihood the firm will choose private 
placements over public offerings.  
Continuing the same argument as above, we add the following four hypotheses 
regarding the short-term and long-term performance of Chinese firms involved in 
seasoned equity offerings. 
Hypothesis 3a: Short-term performance (abnormal return at announcement) for 
rights offering would be lower than that of a public offering or private 
placements. 
Hypothesis 3b: Short-tem performance (abnormal return at announcement) for 
public offering firms would be lower than that of private placements. 
Hypothesis 4a:  Long-term performance of firms that choose rights offering is  
inferior to that of the public-offering firms or firms issuing private placements. 
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Hypothesis 4b: Long-term performance of firms issuing public offerings will be 
lower than that of firms issuing private placements. . 
 
4.5. Data and Methodology 
  
In this section, we discuss the data source, research methodology, and how we test for 
price effects of announcements of rights offerings.  
 
4.5.1. Data Source 
 
 We obtained the data needed for this study from CSMAR China Stock Market 
Trading Database and CSMAR China Seasoned New Issue and Rights Offerings 
Research Database. Our test period covered 1999 through 2003.The sample consists of 
463 announcements of seasoned equity offerings by firms listed in either Shanghai Stock 
Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 285 of them were standby rights offerings, 61 
were underwritten public offerings and 117 private placements. The stock price data is 
obtained from the CSMAR trading database.  
 
4.5.2. Methodology  
 
In the methodology section we elaborate on the econometric techniques used to 
test each of the hypotheses presented in section IV.  
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To test Hypothesis 1 (the higher the government ownership, the higher the 
inefficiency), we perform both parametric and non-parametric tests. The firms issuing 
SEOs are divided into 3 categories depending on the percentage of shares owned by the 
government. 1) The government ownership percentage is above 30%, 2) The government 
ownership is from 29.99% to 15% and 3) The government ownership is below 15%, then 
we use the Kruskal-Wallis test to test for the equality of the medians among the 3 
samples. Then, it shows the relationship between the extent of government ownership on 
the one hand and variables that measure and contribute to the inefficiency on the other. 
The variables we use to assess the inefficiency of the firms are: The non-essential 
expenses, NESSEX, the investment opportunity set of the firms, INVEX, the debt ratio, 
DB, the percentage of shares owned by the managers of the firm, MANOWN, and the 
percentage of shares owned by the institutional shareholders, INST. 
Additionally, to test the hypothesis at 1, we use OLS regressions. In the first OLS 
model the percentage of government ownership GOV is the dependent variable, while the 
independent variables are 1) NESSEX, the non-essential expenses which is computed as 
the total expenses minus costs of goods sold, wage expenses and interest expenses 
divided by the total expenses; 2) INVEX, the Investment expenditure which is the long-
term investment expenditure divided by the total assets; 3) DB, the debt ratio; 
4)MANOWN, the percentage of shares owned by the firms managers; 5) INST, the 
percentage of shares owned by the institutional shareholders of the firm (Institutional 
shareholders are other local and regional government agencies, or government owned 
banks and mutual funds). Therefore the model is:  
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GOV = β0 + β1NESSEX + + β2INVEX + β3DB + β4MANOWN + β5INST + ε 
 
We expect the signs of the variables NESSEX, and DB, to be positive, while the sign of 
all the other variables to be negative since firms with higher government ownership 
would entail higher unnecessary expenses, higher use of debt, lower growth opportunities 
combined with lesser degree of monitoring.  
To test Hypothesis 1B (The higher the government ownership, the lower the firm  
Performance all else the same), we use ROA and Tobin’s Q as dependent variables. ROA 
measures operating performance, while Tobin’s Q measures market performance. 
 When ROA is used as the dependent variable, the independent variables are 1) the 
non-essential expenses, NESSEX; 2) the investment opportunity set, INVEX; 3) the debt 
ratio, DB; and the Government ownership, GOV; 4) the managerial ownership variable, 
MANOWN; 5) the institutional ownership variable, INST.  
 
ROA = β0 + + β1NESSEX + + β2INVEX + β3DB + β4MANOWN + β5INST +β6GOV + ε 
  
We expect the signs of the non-essential expenses, debt ratio and government 
ownership to be negative, while the sign of the investment opportunity set, managerial 
ownership and institutional ownership variables to be positive. 
When  Tobin’s Q serves as the dependent variable the independent variables are 
1) NESSEX, the non-essential expenses which is computed as the total expenses minus 
costs of goods sold, wage expenses and interest expenses divided by the total expenses; 
2) INVEX, the Investment expenditure which is the long-term investment expenditure 
66 
divided by the total assets; 3) DB, the debt ratio; 4) MANOWN, the percentage of shares 
owned by the firms managers; 5) INST, the percentage of shares owned by the 
institutional shareholders of the firm and 6) GOV, the percentage of the government 
ownership. Therefore the model is:  
 
Q = β0 + β1NESSEX + + β2INVEX + β3DB + β4MANOWN + β5INST +β6GOV + ε 
 
We expect the signs of the variables NESSEX, DB and GOV to be negative, while the 
sign of all the other variables to be positive since higher government ownership, 
unnecessary expenses, and debt ratio will affect Q negatively, while INVEX, MANOWN 
and INST are expected to have positive impact on Q. To test Hypotheses 2A (the higher 
the government ownership, the higher the likelihood that the firm will choose rights 
offerings) and Hypothesis 2B (the higher the institutional ownership, the higher the 
likelihood that the firm will choose private placements), we use multinomial Logit model 
of firms’ choice of alternative SEO methods. The dependent variable equals to 0 if a firm 
issues rights offerings, 1 if the firm issues public offering and 2 if the firm chooses 
private placements. The independent variables consist of proxies for agency costs, 
political costs and investment opportunities, leverage ratio. The multinomial logit model 
is a powerful technique to analyze individual-level choice data.   
To test Hypothesis 3A (Short-term performance (abnormal return at announcement) 
for rights offering would be lower than that of a public offering) and 3B (Short-term 
performance of firms issuing private placements would be higher than that of public 
offering), we employ the event study methodology recommended by Brown and Warner 
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(1985) to examine the effects of rights issues on stock returns. The abnormal return for 
firm i on day t is  
 
ARi,t = Ri,t – Rm,i,t
 
Where, Ri,t is the return on day t for a firm in our sample, and Rm,i,t is the market return on 
day t. Average abnormal returns for each trading day is: 
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Where, N is the number of stocks. 
 
The Cumulative Abnormal Return from day K to L is  
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Where, T= K – L + 1; Var(ARt) and Cov(ARt,ARt+1) are estimated from 122 days to 11 
days before the announcement day and from 11 days to 122 days after the announcement 
day. The Covariance term adjusts for possible first-order autocorrelation between the 
abnormal returns due to non-synchronous trading.  
To check the robustness of our event study results, we employ a Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) regression analysis with CAR as the dependent variable. GLS equation is 
shown below.):  
CARi,−1,0 = α1 + β2MANOWNi + β 3INSTi+ β 4GOVi  
+ β 5NESSEXi + β 6DUMMYi + εi  
where, DUMMYi is a dummy variable that takes value one if the issue is a rights offering 
and zero if it is a public offering. The MANOWN is the percentage of shares owned by 
the senior managers. The INST is a variable representing the percentage of shares owned 
by the institutional shareholders. GOV is the percentage of shares owned by the 
government, NESSEX is the non-essential expenditure which is calculated as the total 
expenses minus costs of goods sold, wage expenses and interest expenses as a fraction of 
total expenses.  
  
Finally, to test Hypothesis 4 (Long-term performance of firms that choose rights 
offerings is inferior to that of the public-offering firms), we follow two procedures. First, 
we use Loughran and Ritter (1995) methodology to calculate the average buy and hold 
abnormal return (BHAR). The average buy-and-hold abnormal return, BHAR, for τ 
months is calculates as:  
 
69 
, , ,
1 1 1
1 [ (1 ) (1 )]
N
i t c i t
i t t
BHAR r r
N
τ τ
τ
= = =
= + − +∑ ∏ ∏  
 
Where, ri,t is the monthly stock return for announcement firm i and rc,i,t is the monthly 
market return or the monthly return on matched portfolio firm i.  The test statistic for the 
null hypothesis of no average buy-and-hold abnormal return is the skewness adjusted t-
statistic calculated as:  
 
tBHARτ = tBHARτ + (
1
3
N )(tBHARτ)2skewτ + (
6
N )skewτ
 
Where, tBHARτ is the usual t-statistic for BHARτ and skewτ is the skewness of the BHARt 
series (t=1,…τ) 
 
Second, we use long-term accounting performance to measure the profitability 
and operating efficiency of the firms post-issuance. The profitability performance 
measures that we use are: 1) ROA; 2) Profit Margin. The operating efficiency measures 
are: 1) Operating performance. The profitability and operating performance variables are 
calculated 1 and 2 years post-issuance and compared with a matched sample of firms. 
The firms in the matched sample are selected according to three criteria: Industry, size 
and government ownership. In all the cases, we first select a firm that matches the same 
industry category as the issuing firm controlling for the size and government ownership 
percentage. We follow the methodology described in Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh 
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(1994) in a controlling for the government ownership in the matched sample firms 
selection process.  
 
4.6. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section shows the summary statistics for the new equity issue method. The 
descriptive summary proceeds into two parts: First, we present the industry classification 
table of the sample of firms issuing rights offerings and public offerings. Second, we 
present the total number of issues per year and total proceeds from the issues. Third, we 
present a modified table where we divide the number of SEOs into 4 categories according 
to the percentage of shares owned by the government. 
Table 1 shows the total number of companies that issued new equity during the 
period 1999-2003 classified according to major industry group.
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Table 1: Industry Classification of a sample of 463 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) with 285 Standby Rights 
Offerings (ROs) and 61 Underwritten Public Offerings (Pos), 117 private placements (PPs) during the period 1999-
2003.  The SEOs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. (CSMAR)  
 
Industry Type 
Rights 
Offerings 
(RO) 
Public 
Offerings 
(PO) 
Private 
Placements 
(PP) 
RO % PO 
% 
PP 
% 
Electrical, Electronic and 
Industrial Manufacturing 
Equipment 
88 22 61 30.88% 33.33% 52.14% 
Mining and Metal Products 71 4 14 24.91% 6.06% 11.97% 
Information Technology 8 4 22 2.81% 6.06% 18.80% 
Consulting Services 9 8 5 3.16% 12.12% 4.27% 
Real Estate  6 3 1 2.11% 6.06% 0.85% 
Paper, Publishing and 
Consumer Goods 15 5 2 5.26% 7.58% 1.71% 
Transportation 19   6.67% 0.00% 0.00% 
Conglomerates 21 1 2 7.37% 3.03% 1.71% 
Retailing 23 3 3 8.07% 4.55% 2.56% 
Food and Beverages 18 6 4 6.32% 9.09% 3.42% 
Miscellaneous 7 5 3 2.46% 12.12% 2.56% 
Total 285 66 117 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 2 reports the number of rights offerings, public offerings and private 
placements per year. During the period of 1999 to 2003 there has been a steady increase 
in the use of private placements as a new method of equity issue. The use of private 
placements as a third equity issue method started in 1999 after the enactment of the 
Chinese securities law of 1999. Table 2 reports also the total net proceeds per year from 
issuing new equity. The total net proceeds which is in billions of the Chinese currency 
Renminbi, is calculated as the total proceeds from the offering minus the total issuing 
expenses. 
Table 2: Distribution of a sample of 463 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) with 285 Standby Rights 
Offerings (ROs) and 61 Underwritten Public Offerings (Pos), 117 private placements (PPs) during the 
period 1999-2003. The Total Net proceeds are in millions of Chinese Currency Renminbi (RMB), 
calculated as the total proceeds from the equity issue minus the total issuing expenses The SEOs are 
identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. (CSMAR)  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Panel A: Number of SEOs 113 128 96 72 54 
Rights Offerings (Standby) 104 104 51 10 16 
Public Offerings 8 2 32 10 9 
Private Placements  1 22 13 52 29 
      
Panel B: Total Net Proceeds (RMB) 
Rights Offerings (Standby) 1956.64 2056.36 1028.32 24.36 35.29 
Public Offerings 74.23 4.21 247.36 81.25 78.52 
Private Placements 0.36 63.88 42.01 134.37 75.10 
 
 
In Table 3 we report the number of seasoned equity offerings divided into three 
groups according of the percentage of government ownership variable, GOV. The total 
sample of 463 firms is divided into 3 categories: 1) The government ownership 
percentage is above 30%, 2) The government ownership is from 29.99% to 15% and 3) 
The government ownership is below 15%. The majority of firms issuing rights offerings 
are in the upper two categories; firms issuing public offerings lie in the middle category; 
42 out of the 61 firms issuing public offerings are in the middle category, while firms 
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issuing private placements lie in the lowest category; 79 out of the 117. The interesting 
result to report from table 3 is the fact that all the private placements were made by firms 
that have lowest government ownership; the underwritten public offerings were made by 
firms having medium government ownership, while rights offerings are made by firms 
with high government ownership. Therefore, just by comparing the three sub-samples, we  
notice that firms with higher government ownership rely on rights offerings as their 
equity issue method, while firms issuing public offerings and private placements have 
lower government ownership concentration, the latter having the lowest government 
ownership among them. 
Table 3: Distribution of the total sample of 463 SEOs into 3 categories with respect to the government 
ownership variable, which is divided into 3 classes.  
Government 
Ownership 
Percentage Category 
Number of 
SEOs in 
each 
category 
Number of 
Rights 
issuing firms 
Number 
of Public 
Issuing 
Firm 
Number of 
Private 
Placements 
Above 30% 109 109 0 0 
29.99 to 15% 225 145 42 38 
Below 15% 129 31 19 79 
 463 285 61 117 
 
 
Table 4 reports the number of SEO firms divided by the median value of the 
government ownership variable which is 0.1917. The firms are classified according to 
their location above the median or below the median regarding the government 
ownership concentration. The results confirm the results found in the previous tables, 
firms with the highest government ownership use rights offerings as equity issue method, 
firms with mid-government ownership levels use underwritten public offerings, while 
firms with the lowest government ownership use private placements. 
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Table 4: Distribution of the total sample of 463 Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) with 285 Standby 
Rights Offerings (ROs) , 61 Underwritten Public Offerings (Pos) and 117 private placements (PPs) during 
the period 1999-2003 divided by the median value of the government ownership variable  (0.1917).    
 
 SEO Issue Type 
 ROs POs PPs 
Above Median 175 41 15 
Below Median 110 20 102 
 
 
 
In table 5 we report the correlation matrix of the variables that will be used in the 
regression analysis. The results clearly show that correlation between ROA on the one 
hand and NESSEX, DB and GOV on the other hand is negative. This provides indirect 
evidence of inefficiency when government ownership is relatively high. 
 
Table 5: The correlation matrix of the variables used, the ROA, NESSEX, non-essential expenses, DB, the 
debt ratio, INVEX, the investment opportunity set, and the percentage of shares owned by the government, 
GOV, MANOWN, the managerial ownership percentage and the INST, the institutional ownership 
percentage. 
Variable NESSEX INST MANOWN INVEX DB GOV ROA 
Non-Essential Expenditure (NESSEX) 1.00       
Institutional shareholders (INST) -0.241c 1.00      
Managerial Ownership (MANOWN) -0.084 0.205c 1.00     
Investment opportunity Set (INVEX) -0.314b 0.281b 0.018 1.00    
Debt Ratio (DB) 0.0584 -0.172 -0.047 -0.015 
1.00 
   
Government Ownership (GOV) 0.608a -0.324c -0.028 -0.418b 0.297c 1.00  
ROA -0.125 0.274c 0.098 0.374a -0.087 -0.098 1.00 
a significant at 1%,b significant at 5% ,c significant at 10% 
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4.7. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical analysis part is divided into 4 sections within which we test each of 
the hypotheses proposed in section IV of the essay. In the first section we establish the 
relationship between government ownership and firm efficiency. In the second section, 
we study the effect of the government ownership on the choice of the seasoned equity 
offering method. In the third section, we study the short-term performance of the firms 
issuing SEOs. Finally, in the last section, we study the long-term performance of the 
equity issuing firms post-SEO.  
 
4.7.1. Government ownership and firm efficiency 
 The relationship between government ownership and firm efficiency is tested 
using parametric and non-parametric tests. Table 5 reports the results of the non-
parametric, Kruskal-Wallis test. 
Table 6: The sample of 463 firms issuing SEOs during the period 1999-2003 is divided into 4 categories 
according to the percentage of shares owned by the government. For each independent variable, the median 
is calculated for each sub-sample; the Chi-square statistic is the Kruskal-Wallis test of medians. 
Variable Above 30% 
29.99 to 
15% 
Below 
15% 
Chi- 
Square 
statistic 
Asymptotic 
Significance 
Non-Essential Expenditure (NESSEX) 0.1247 0.0768 0.0304 12.951 0.002 
Investment opportunity set (INVEX) 0.0751 0.1011 0.1613 13.818 0.000 
Institutional Ownership (INST) 0.0925 0.1603 0.2218 14.281 0.000 
Managerial Ownership (MANOWN) 0.0084 0.0207 0.0299 3.875 0.384 
Debt Ratio (DB) 0.1172 0.0836 0.0468 11.957 0.004 
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 The total sample of firms issuing SEOs is divided into three categories depending 
on the percentage of shares owned by the government. The independent variables are the 
1) NESSEX, the non-essential expenses which is computed as the total expenses minus 
costs of goods sold, wage expenses and interest expenses divided by the total expenses; 
2) INVEX, the Investment expenditure which is the long-term investment expenditure 
divided by the total assets; 3) DB, the debt-to-asset ratio; 4) MANOWN, the percentage 
of shares owned by the firms managers; 5) INST, the percentage of shares owned by the 
institutional shareholders of the firm.  
For each of the independent variables in the table we find the median value for 
each sub-sample and use the Kruskal-Wallis test for the medians. The non-essential 
expenses (NESSEX) and debt ratio (DB) are significantly larger for firms with high 
government ownership than their low government counterparts. Institutional holdings 
(INST) of the former are significantly lower. These results attest to the inefficiencies of 
and lack of monitoring for firms with high government ownership  This may explain why 
these firms were unable to take advantage of higher (than firms with low government 
ownership) investment opportunity set.  
 
In order to test hypothesis 1, we also use two OLS regressions. In the first 
regression, ROA is the dependent variable. The independent variables are: 1) the non 
essential expenses, NESSEX; 2) the investment opportunity set, INVEX; 3) The debt 
ratio, DB; and the Government ownership, GOV.  The results are presented in Table 7. 
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 Table 7: The dependent variable is the ROA, the independent variables are NESSEX, non-essential 
expenses, DB, the debt ratio, INVEX, the investment opportunity set, and the percentage of shares owned 
by the government, GOV. 
 Regression 1 
Intercept 0.108a
 (15.111) 
NESSEX -0.160a
 (-5.529) 
INVEX 0.017 
 (0.684) 
DB -0.164a
 (-4.368) 
GOV -0.021a
 (-4.403) 
MANOWN 0.002 
 (0.047) 
INST 0.065a
 (3.642) 
R2 0.519 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
Table 7 demonstrates that the higher the government ownership, the lower the 
firm’s operating performance (ROA). The coefficient of GOV is negative and significant 
at the 1% level. Consistent with this finding, the coefficients of NESSEX and DB are 
negative, while that of INST is positive. All three coefficients are statistically significant 
at 1%. 
In Table 8, we use Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable while independent 
variables are the same as in Table 6. Table 8 confirms the results in Table 6. Consistent 
with hypothesis 1B, firms with higher government ownership, higher debt ratio and 
higher non-essential expenses are likely to have lower Q. A major conclusion that can be 
derived from Table 7 and 8 is that high government ownership adversely affects both the 
operating and market performance of a firm. 
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Table 8: OLS regression with the dependent variable being Tobin’s q ratio, Q. The independent variables 
are the non-essential expenses, NESSEX, the investment opportunity set, INVEX, the debt ratio, DB, the 
government ownership percentage, GOV, the percentage of managerial ownership shares, MANOWN, and 
the percentage of institutional shares, INST.  
 Regression 1 
Intercept 1.845a 
 (34.155) 
NESSEX -1.333a 
 (-6.127) 
INVEX 1.123a 
 (6.088) 
DB -1.554a 
 (-5.508) 
GOV -0.156a 
 (-4.288) 
MANOWN 0.349 
 (1.170) 
INST 0.662a 
 (4.941) 
R2 0.682 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
4.7.2. Government Ownership and Choice of SEO method 
In Hypothesis 2a, we argue that that higher government ownership and the 
resulting poor performance would likely render these firms to choose the rights offering 
method to raise external equity. To test this hypothesis, we perform a multinomial 
logistic regression in which we attempt to determine the variables that affect a firm’s 
choice of one of the two available methods of seasoned equity offerings. When a firm 
chooses rights offering, the dependent variable takes on a value of 0, when it chooses 
underwritten public offering, its value is 1 and when it chooses private placements the 
value is 2. Table 9 we report the results of the multinomial logistic regression.  
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Table 9: Multinomial logistic regression to explain the choice of the SEO method using a sample of 463 
SEOs during the period 1999-2003. The dependent variable is the method of raising equity which takes on 
a value of 0 when a firm issues ROs, 1 for when it issues POs and 2 when the firm uses private placements. 
MANOWN is the percentage shares held by managers, INST is the percentage of shares held by the 
Institutional shareholders including institutional and private investors but excluding the government. GOV 
is the percentage of shares held by the government. NESSEX is the ratio of non-essential expenditures over 
total expenses, INVEX is the long-term investment expenditure to total asset ratio. DB is the total debt 
over total assets ratio and ROA. The default choice method is 0, rights offering choice. The Wald statistic 
is shown in the parentheses.  
 Reg.1a 
(PO) 
Reg. 1b 
(PP) 
Reg. 2a 
(PO) 
Reg. 2b 
(PP) 
Reg. 3a 
(PO) 
Reg. 3b 
(PP) 
Intercept 11.901 54.315a 10.353 51.573b 10.827 52.847b
 (2.128) (8.819) (1.608) (5.175) (1.910) (7.824) 
MANOWN 18.510 101.098c 15.081 153.599b 14.365 142.367b
 (0.330) (3.566) (0.209) (4.306) (1.071) (5.074) 
INST 32.907c 97.360a 30.027 120.832a 35.247c 114.392c
 (3.070) (9.890) (2.419) (8.278) (2.974) (8.047) 
GOV -16.545b -162.759a -15.058b -204.996b -18.314b -187.682b
 (4.605) (7.941) (4.065) (6.338) (5.317) (7.589) 
NESSEX -141.961a -266.661a -140.870a -295.039a -139.148a -271.364a
 (7.618) (14.150) (7.646) (11.716) (8.051) (13.847) 
INVEX 77.473a 58.433c 74.778a 39.269 81.236a 79.682a
 (9.776) (2.924) (8.201) (0.948) (8.521) (7.982) 
DB -90.677a -223.183a -94.722c -243.229a -88.521a -219.378a
 (4.016) (9.166) (4.149) (8.101) (3.974) (8.375) 
ROA   25.179 135.403c   
   (0.512) (3.388)   
Industry 
Dummy 
    10.374 15.397 
     (1.074) (1.896) 
Nagelkerke R2 0.723 0.782 0.738 
McFadden R2 0.647 0.750 0.716 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
Table 9 reports three different models of multinomial logistic regression. In 
Equation 1, right-hand side variables are MANOWN, INST, GOV, NESSEX, INVEX, 
and DB. Equation 2 adds to these ROA; while Equation 3 adds industry dummy. In the 
three models, the rights offering choice is taken as the default offering method, while the 
two other methods are compared to the rights offerings choice. Higher government 
ownership, higher non-essential expenses, and higher debt ratio lowers the likelihood of 
choosing public offerings relative to rights offerings. On the other hand, higher 
institutional ownership, higher managerial ownership and higher ROA in addition to 
lower government ownership, lower non-essential expenses and lower debt ratio 
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increases the likelihood of choosing private placements over rights offerings, (the INST 
variable being significant at 1% in all the models). The effect of industry is not 
significant in the choice of the equity offering method as we can see in the third 
regression. Therefore, firms issuing private placements have higher institutional 
ownership compared to both firms issuing public offerings and rights offerings. 
Consistent with our hypothesis 2A, the results of the multinomial regressions indicate 
that firms with higher government ownership are more likely to choose rights offerings 
relative to either public offerings or private placements. Also, firms with lower 
government ownership and with higher institutional ownership are more likely to choose 
private placements over rights offerings. 
 
4.7.3. Short-Term Performance 
 
Our third hypothesis is an extension of Hypothesis 2. Our logic proceeds as 
follows. High government ownership introduces inefficiencies which lead to poor 
performance. Because of the poor performance record, a firm with high government 
ownership will prefer the rights offering method to either public offerings or private 
placement. Consequently, the firms issuing rights offering will receive lower abnormal 
returns than either public-offering firms or firms offering private placements. To test this 
hypothesis, we examine the abnormal returns at the announcements of the issuance of the 
three offering methods. We apply the conventional event study methodology for this 
purpose. The abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters 
estimated over a 220-day period ending 21 days before the announcement date (as 
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estimated by Eckbo and Masulis, 1992). The results are reported in Tables 10, 11 and 12. 
Table 10 reports the abnormal returns for rights offering announcement, Table 11 does 
the same for public placement announcements, while Table 12 reports the abnormal 
returns for firms offering private placements.  
Table 10: Cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 285 Rights offering firms during the period 1999-
2003. The ROs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. (CSMAR). Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 220-day period ending 21 days before the 
announcement date. The Chinese stock market’s equally weighted index is used in the market model to 
compute betas. The abnormal returns are calculated in the intervals. The Wilcoxon signed rank test for the 
differences in medians appears in the last column. 
 Cumulative abnormal returns for RO firms 
Interval Mean % Z – statistic Median % Signed rank test 
-5 , -1 -1.35 -2.171d -0.51 -623.50 
-1 , 0 -4.11 -14.281a -2.11 -3874.50 a
0 -3.41 -13.947 a -1.24 -3046.50 b
-1 , +1 -4.87 -12.528a -2.57 -4209.50 a
+1 , +5 -0.94 -1.854 d -0.85 -1593.50 d
-10 , +1 -3.08 -6.235 a -2.17 -4159.50 a
-10 , +10 -3.71 -7.462 a -1.98 -3985.50 a
a significant at 0.1% b significant at 1% c significant at 5% d significant at 10%  
 
Table 10 shows that announcement effects of the rights offering are consistently 
negative and statistically significant. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the 
window of (-1, 0), a window often reported by researchers is -4.11% and is significant at 
the 0.1% level. The results are quite opposite, as Table 11 demonstrates, when a firm 
chooses public offering. CARs are positive and significant for all windows. CAR for the 
(-1, 0) window is 7.69% and significant at the 0.1% level. 
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Table 10: Cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 61 Public offering firms during the period 1999-
2003. The POs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. (CSMAR). Abnormal returns are 
calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 220-day period ending 21 days before the 
announcement date. The Chinese stock market’s equally weighted index is used in the market model to 
compute betas. The abnormal returns are calculated in the intervals. The Wilcoxon signed rank test for the 
differences in medians appears in the last column. 
 Cumulative abnormal returns for the PO firms 
Interval Mean % Z – statistic Median % Signed rank test 
-5 , -1 4.98 13.578a 4.27 3874.50b
-1 , 0 7.69 72.367a 6.14 3986.50 a
0 4.68 62.028 a 3.52 4027.50 a
-1 , +1 10.97 50.237 a 8.49 4987.50 a
+1 , +5 2.78 9.657 a 1.87 2473.50 d
-10 , +1 24.18 39.412 a 17.54 6984.50 a
-10 , +10 21.87 45.217 a 16.97 7158.50 a
a significant at 0.1% b significant at 1% c significant at 5% d significant at 10%  
 
Table 12 reports the results of firms issuing private placements. The CARs in this 
case are more positive than the public offering counterpart. The CAR for the (-1,0) 
widow is 8.63 which is significant at 0.1% level. 
Table 12: Cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 117 Private Placements (PPs) during the period 
1999-2003. The PPs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. (CSMAR). Abnormal 
returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 220-day period ending 21 days 
before the announcement date. The Chinese stock market’s equally weighted index is used in the market 
model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are calculated in the intervals. The Wilcoxon signed rank 
test for the differences in medians appears in the last column. 
 Cumulative abnormal returns for the PO firms 
Interval Mean % Z – statistic Median % Signed rank test 
-5 , -1 5.27 14.379a 4.85 4018.50b
-1 , 0 8.63 79.364a 7.13 4157.50 a
0 5.47 69.405 a 3.87 4287.50 a
-1 , +1 12.85 57.571 a 9.54 5369.50 a
+1 , +5 4.08 17.107 a 2.15 2874.50 d
-10 , +1 30.15 41.572 a 21.65 7485.50 a
-10 , +10 28.75 48.892 a 19.47 8024.50 a
a significant at 0.1% b significant at 1% c significant at 5% d significant at 10%  
 
 
To summarize the results in Tables 10 to 12, investors in Chinese firms react 
negatively to rights offering and positively to both underwritten public offerings and 
private placements. The results are consistent with our third hypothesis 3A, 3B and 3C 
and clearly indicate that the rights offering signals bad news, while public offering and 
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private placements signals good news to investors. This finding is of particular interest 
because opposite finding appear to prevail for the non-Chinese firms.  A large number of 
studies on U.S. firms have shown that SEOs are associated with negative abnormal 
returns, especially when the method used is firm commitment underwritten offer. On the 
other hand, studies (Kang and Stulz, 1996 and Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen, 1997) 
document positive abnormal returns to uninsured rights issues in other countries. The 
unique ownership structure of Chinese firms might explain this contradiction. On the 
other hand, the monitoring benefit from the private placement buyer is one reason behind 
the higher positive abnormal returns of the private placements announcement. The 
highest abnormal returns associated with the private placements are consistent with the 
U.S. data. The certification provided by the placement buyer translates in the market 
reaction with highest abnormal returns. 
 
 Tables 13 and 14 report the CARs for the private placements to local investor and 
foreign investors separately. The interesting result from those tables is the fact that the 
CAR for the local investors in more positive than that of the foreign investors. The 
market reaction is more positive when the private placement buyer is a local firm or 
investor. It can be deduced that the market regards the monitoring provided by the local 
investor to be better than that provided by the foreign investor. 
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Table 13: Cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 63 Private Placements (PPs) to local investors 
during the period 1999-2003. The PPs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. 
(CSMAR). Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 220-day 
period ending 21 days before the announcement date. The Chinese stock market’s equally weighted index 
is used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are calculated in the intervals. The 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for the differences in medians appears in the last column. 
 Cumulative abnormal returns for the PP firms 
Interval Mean % Z – statistic Median % Signed rank test 
-5 , -1 7.81 15.239a 5.87 4972.50b
-1 , 0 10.23 69.367a 9.21 5874.50 a
0 6.37 71.248 a 4.65 5069.50 a
-1 , +1 14.85 61.394 a 11.08 6102.50 a
+1 , +5 5.71 20.024 a 3.27 3847.50 d
-10 , +1 37.25 54.217 a 28.36 8025.50 a
-10 , +10 34.58 53.987 a 24.78 8243.50 a
a significant at 0.1% b significant at 1% c significant at 5% d significant at 10%  
 
 
Table 14: Cumulative abnormal returns for a sample of 54 Private Placements (PPs) to foreign investors 
during the period 1999-2003. The PPs are identified from the Chinese Rights Offerings database. 
(CSMAR). Abnormal returns are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over a 220-day 
period ending 21 days before the announcement date. The Chinese stock market’s equally weighted index 
is used in the market model to compute betas. The abnormal returns are calculated in the intervals. The 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for the differences in medians appears in the last column. 
 
 Cumulative abnormal returns for the PP firms 
Interval Mean % Z – statistic Median % Signed rank test 
-5 , -1 4.23 10.319b 2.17 4972.50b
-1 , 0 7.92 21.3587a 4.78 5874.50 a
0 3.10 18.238 a 1.46 5069.50 a
-1 , +1 10.04 31.247 a 7.31 6102.50 a
+1 , +5 2.94 14.236 a 3.27 3847.50 d
-10 , +1 19.36 38.328 a 28.36 8025.50 a
-10 , +10 18.74 32.159 a 24.78 8243.50 a
a significant at 0.1% b significant at 1% c significant at 5% d significant at 10%  
 
 
 
 
In Table 15, we validate our finding in Tables 10 to 12 that negative (positive) 
abnormal returns of rights offering firms (public offering firms) are related to the extent 
of government ownership in Chinese semi-privatized firms; the positive abnormal returns 
of the private placements are related to the institutional ownership. To explain the 
abnormal returns surrounding SEO issue announcements, we estimate the cross-sectional 
regression using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) where the dependent variable is the 
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cumulative abnormal return over the window (-1, 0). We estimate 3 different models of 
the equation to assess the effect of different variables on the stock price. 
Table 15: GLS regression to explain the valuation effect of the SEO announcement a sample of 463 SEOs 
285 Standby Rights Offerings (ROs) and 61 Underwritten Public Offerings (Pos), 117 private placements 
(PPs) during the period 1999-2003. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return during the 
two-day announcement window CAR(-1,0). The independent variables are: MANOWN is the percentage 
shares held by managers, INST is the percentage of shares held by the institutional shareholders including 
institutional and private investors but excluding the government. GOV is the percentage of shares held by 
the government. NESSEX is the ratio of non-essential expenditures over total expenses. INVEX is the 
investment opportunity set. Dummy A is equal to 1 when the offering is private placements, 0 otherwise 
and Dummy B is equal to 1 when the offering is rights issue, 0 otherwise. 
 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
Intercept 3.592 4.381 3.230 
 (0.169) (0.236) (0.291) 
MANOWN 0.263 0.310c 0.1396 
 (0.204) (2.232) (0.935) 
INST 0.237 c 0.415a 0.245 
 (1.294) (3.126) (0.507) 
GOV -0.205 b -0.126a -0.207 b
 (-2.381) (-4.121) (-2.691) 
NESSEX -0.347c -0.720b -0.371 
 (1.789) (2.204) (0.127) 
INVEX 0.397 0.914 0.692 
 (0.287) (0.274) (0.502) 
DUMMY A  0.719a  
  (2.875)  
DUMMY B   0.563a
   (2.940) 
R2 0.34 0.38 0.41 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
 
Three variables that affect announcement returns for when the issuance type is 
rights offerings are the government ownership concentration only while the variables 
affecting the announcement returns when the issuance type is private placements are the 
government ownership, the institutional holding, and the non-essential expenditure.  
Government ownership and rights offering negatively affect, while institutional holding 
positively affect announcement returns. In summary, the choice of equity financing 
method by Chinese firms reveals the extent of ownership conflict between the 
government and institutions. The results support hypothesis 3. 
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4.7.4. Long-term performance Analysis 
 Hypothesis 4 states that long-term post-announcement performance of rights 
issuing firms will be inferior to that of public offering firms and firms issuing private 
placements. Also, firms issuing private placements will have superior long-term 
performance than the public issuing firms due to the positive monitoring effect provided 
by the placement buyer. In this section, we examine both market and operating 
performance of Chinese firms that issued seasoned equity offering. 
In examining long-term performance, it is necessary to select a benchmark against 
which the sample performance must be evaluated. Barber and Lyon (1997) find that 
results are influenced by the benchmark being selected. We select two benchmarks for 
the purpose of comparisons.  
The first benchmark consists of firms which 1) did not issue new equity during 
the same period; 2) belonged to the same industry; 3) were of similar to post-issuance 
asset size and 4) similar degree of government ownership as the SEO firms. If a matching 
company could not be found in the same industry, we select a company closest to the 
issuing company’s industry with similar size. This benchmark is used to evaluate both 
operating and market performance. When evaluating market performance, we add the 
market return (weighted average of returns of stocks listed in the two exchanges in 
China) as a second benchmark.  
Table 16 compares the market performance of the rights and public offering firms 
with that of the two benchmarks stated above.  Panel A of Table 16 shows that the long-
term market performance of the rights offering sample is significantly inferior to that of 
the benchmarks. This result is especially true for +1 and +2 years.  Rights issuing firms 
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significantly under-perform the market portfolio by -4.93% and -5.01% in year +1 and 
year +2 respectively.  Compared to the matched sample, their levels of underperformance 
are -3.67% and -3.29% in year +1 and year +2 respectively. Both differences are 
significant at the 1% level 
Table 16: Long-term returns of Rights issuing firms, public issuing firms and firms issuing private 
placements with their respective non-issuing matching firms using holding period return method. The mean 
difference is tested using a two-tail t test while the median difference is tested using a nonparametric 
Wilcoxon Z test.  
 6-months 1 year 2 years 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
PANEL A. MARKET PERFORMANCE OF RIGHTS 
ISSUING FIRMS     
Comparison with market return     
Return of Rights Issuing Firms 9.32 6.34 13.54 10.29 29.38 23.05 
Market Return 12.85 7.39 18.47 14.05 34.39 27.41 
Difference -3.53a -1.05c -4.93a -3.76a -5.01a -4.36a
       
Comparison with industry-and size matched firms   
Return of Rights Issuing Firms 9.32 6.34 13.54 10.29 29.38 23.05 
Return of the matched firms 10.11 6.41 17.21 12.97 32.67 22.59 
Difference -0.79 -0.07 -3.67a -2.68b -3.29a 0.46 
       
PANEL B. MARKET PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS OFFERING PRIVATE 
PLACEMENTS   
Comparison with market return     
Return of Private Placements Firms 14.29 9.87 23.04 17.85 37.28 30.75 
Market Return 12.85 7.39 18.47 14.05 34.39 27.41 
Difference 1.44c 2.48b 4.57a 3.8a 2.89a 3.34a
       
Comparison with industry-and size matched firms   
Return of Private Placements Firms 14.29 9.87 23.04 17.85 37.28 30.75 
Return of the matched firms 11.83 8.27 21.53 16.37 34.95 28.94 
Difference 2.46a 1.6c 1.51c 1.48c 2.33b 1.81c
       
PANELC. MARKET PERFORMANCE 
OF PUBLIC OFFERING FIRMS      
Comparison with market return     
Return of Public Offering Firms 13.28 10.83 21.95 17.83 35.28 28.67 
Market Return 12.85 7.39 18.47 14.05 34.39 27.41 
Difference 0.43 3.44a 3.48a 3.78a 0.89 1.26c
       
Comparison with industry-and size matched firms   
Return of Public Offering Firms 13.28 10.83 21.95 17.83 35.28 28.67 
Return of the matched firms 12.63 9.76 22.34 17.54 36.42 28.32 
Difference 0.65 1.07 -0.39 0.29 -1.14c 0.35 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5%  c significant at 10% 
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 Opposite results hold true for the private placements group.  The group 
significantly outperforms the market in years +1 and +2. Compared to the matched 
sample, this group performs significantly better in all three of the post-issuance period.  
On the other hand the firms issuing public offerings do not have consistent results 
regarding their out performance with respect to the matched sample or the market. These 
results are consistent with our hypothesis that long-term market performance of the rights 
offering group is inferior to its public offering counterpart. 
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Table 17: Comparison of long-term accounting performance between firms issuing rights offerings, firms 
issuing private placements and public offering firms with their respective matched samples.  The mean 
difference is tested using a two-tail t test while the median difference is tested using a nonparametric 
Wilcoxon Z test. The ROA is calculated as the net income over total assets. The Operating performance is 
calculated as EBIT divided by the total assets. The profit margin is calculated as net income over revenue.   
 Pre-offering year Offering Year 
1 Year after 
offering 
2 Years after 
offering 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Accounting 
Performance of  Rights Issuers         
a) Return on Assets (ROA)         
Rights Issuing Firms 4.53 2.17 5.23 2.98 4.89 1.87 4.78 1.59 
Matched Sample 4.12 2.01 5.78 3.04 5.07 2.36 5.03 2.47 
Difference 0.41 0.16 -0.55 -0.06 -0.18 -0.49 -0.25 -0.88 
         
b) Operating Performance (EBIT/TA) 
Rights Issuing Firms 3.12 1.24 3.65 1.87 3.17 1.27 3.11 1.17 
Matched Sample 5.33 2.51 5.37 2.41 6.07 2.87 6.13 2.91 
Difference -2.21b -1.27c -1.72c -0.54 -2.9b -1.6c -3.02a -1.74c
         
c) Profit Margin         
Rights Issuing Firms 5.11 1.98 5.17 2.03 4.87 1.54 4.97 2.01 
Matched Sample 7.69 3.48 8.17 4.03 7.36 3.17 7.31 3.47 
Difference -2.58b -1.5c -3a -2c -2.49c -1.63c -2.34b -1.46c
         
Panel B: Accounting 
Performance of Public Offering 
Firms         
a) Return on Assets (ROA)         
Public Issuing Firms 7.25 4.26 8.11 4.86 8.17 5.01 8.45 5.93 
Matched Sample 7.36 4.32 8.56 5.17 8.13 5.11 7.58 5.17 
Difference -0.11 -0.06 -0.45 -0.31 0.04 -0.1 0.87 0.76 
         
b) Operating Performance (EBIT/TA)       
Public Issuing Firms 7.86 4.35 8.13 4.89 8.32 5.03 8.14 4.21 
Matched Sample 7.25 5.11 7.11 3.98 7.89 4.03 8.36 4.31 
Difference 0.61 -0.76 1.02c 0.91 0.43 1 -0.22 -0.1 
         
c) Profit Margin         
Public Issuing Firms 11.14 7.89 11.54 7.41 10.24 6.21 10.11 5.98 
Matched Sample 10.23 6.52 9.87 5.84 9.63 5.32 8.56 5.21 
Difference 0.91 1.37c 1.67c 1.57c 0.61 0.89 1.55c 0.77 
         
Panel C: Accounting 
Performance of Firms issuing 
Private Placements         
a) Return on assets (ROA)         
Private Placement Firms 7.42 6.38 8.11 5.36 8.32 6.17 8.97 6.31 
Matched Sample 6.13 4.23 7.19 4.98 7.54 4.87 7.93 5.14 
Difference 1.29c 2.15b 0.92 0.38 0.78 1.3c 1.04c 1.17c
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b) Operating Performance (EBIT/TA)       
Private Placement Firms 10.87 7.15 11.23 7.25 11.59 7.34 12.19 8.03 
Matched Sample 9.11 6.27 10.37 7.06 9.89 5.98 10.23 6.97 
Difference 1.76c 0.88 0.86 0.19 1.7c 1.36c 1.96b 1.06c
         
c) Profit Margin         
Private Placement Firms 11.51 7.31 11.93 7.89 12.27 8.16 12.59 8.34 
Matched Sample 10.27 6.74 10.57 6.89 10.37 6.47 11.09 7.03 
Difference 1.24c 0.57 1.36c 1.00c 1.9b 1.69c 1.5c 1.31c
 
a significant at 1% b significant at 5% c significant at 10% 
 
Table 17 compares the accounting performance of SEO issuers with the matching 
benchmark. Panel A concerns the rights offering group, while Panel B deals with the 
public offering group and Panel C with the private placements. The accounting 
performance of the three groups mirrors their market performance shown in Table 16. On 
all three measures of accounting performance, the rights issuers under-perform, while 
issuers of private placements out-perform their corresponding matching groups. The 
group of firms issuing public offerings also out-perform their matching sample but with 
less significant results. The mean value of the difference between the ROA of the rights 
offering firms and its matched sample is -0.18 after 1-year and -0.28 after 2-years. The 
mean value of the difference of the operating profit between the rights offering firms and 
its matched sample is -2.90 after 1-year and -3.02 after 2-years, with 5% and 1% 
significance levels respectively. Finally, the mean value of the difference of the profit 
margin between the rights offering firms and its matched sample is -2.49% after 1-year 
and -2.34% after 2-years, the first being significant at the 10% while the second at the 5% 
level. Median differences give similar results. 
For the sample of firms issuing private placements the accounting performance is 
significantly positive. The mean value of the difference between the ROA of the firms 
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issuing private placements and the matched sample is 0.7% after 1-year and 1.04% after 
2-years, the latter being significant at the10% level. The mean value of the difference of 
the operating profit between the firms issuing private placements and its matched sample 
is 1.7% after 1-year and 1.96% after 2-years, the first being significant at 10% while the 
second is significant at the 5% level. Finally, the profit margin of the firms issuing 
private placements exceeds that of the matched sample by 1.9% in year +1 and 1.5% in 
year +2; the first being significant at 10% while the second is significant at the 5% level. 
The median difference results are similar results to those of the means difference. Finally, 
for the sample of public offering firms the accounting performance is positive and better 
than the matched sample. However the significance is absent for most of the results.  
To summarize, the evidence presented in Table 16 and 17 strongly supports our 
hypothesis that SEO firms that make rights offering significantly under-perform their 
private placement counterparts.   
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4.8. Conclusion 
 
The primary purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that a) firms with higher 
government ownership are still performing poorly during the period 1999-2003, the 
inferior the firm performance and the greater the probability that the firm will choose 
rights offering over public offering or private placement when making seasoned equity 
offering; b) firms with the highest institutional ownership tend to have the best 
performance and efficiency and those firms use private placements as their preferred 
choice of equity issue method. 
This study covers a period that spans from 1999 through 2001. During this period, 
private placements were used as a third method of seasoned equity offering along with 
rights offering and public offering. We examine four hypotheses in this study:  
5) Higher government ownership produces inefficiencies in the firm. The 
inefficiency results from agency conflicts as the wealth-maximization 
goal may be compromised by the social and political agenda of the 
government. 
6) Inefficiency of a firm, due to high government ownership, would lead 
to inferior performance of this firm relative to a firm that has low 
government ownership. 
7) Due to poor performance, a firm with high government ownership 
would prefer rights offering to public offering or private placement. On 
the other hand, firms with highest institutional ownership use private 
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placements, the monitoring and certification provided by the private 
placements’ buyer enhances the firm value further. 
8)  The market would perceive rights offering as signaling bad news and 
react accordingly.  Consequently, the abnormal return to the 
announcement of rights offering would be lower (less positive or more 
negative) than that of the public offering or private placement 
announcements. Long-term performance of firms issuing rights offering 
would also be inferior to that of firms issuing public or private 
placement. The abnormal return to the announcement of the private 
placements is the most positive and the long-term performance of firms 
issuing private placements is superior to that of firms issuing public 
offerings or rights offerings.  
The results reported in this study are consistent with the results of the first 
essay. Moreover, the results concerning the private placements are consistent with 
the monitoring and certification hypothesis.  
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